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PEOPLE v. ALllERTSOr-.. [23 C.2d 
::gb~efaBch thbe c~ntract for the purpose of facilitating the hir-
ux om s employees. 
M~r~over, the contract as pleaded and found i 1 d 
prOVISIOn for a distributing organization It dI'd' nCt u es .no Buxbo t . d . . no reqUIre person~ 0 p.roVl e such an organization or to render any 
with h' servIces; on the contrary, he might have complied 
oth IS A agreement by subcontracting the entire work to 
"d~~~ib t·nd from. the evidence it appears that Buxbom's 
S h 1 uh Ing organIzation" consisted of boys attending higl1 c 00 W 0 were empl0 d t d' . hours at a spec'fi d Yte 0 Istrlbute papers after school 
1 e ra e per thousand Th d 1 ~how: tdhat after the distribution contract' was e:n::~~~ B:~~ 
om a no other work for them Under th . ' thet~cts charged against the ap~ellants co~:e :~~~~:~~eneexes, 
cep IOns to the rule. -
Although I concur in th l' th . d . e cone USlon of my associates that 
e JU gment agamst the appellant Wright sho 1 
versed, for the reasons stated I believe that th . ~ d be re-
to the appellant Smith should be modified by del' JUl1 g~ent has 
amount add f sa owmg t e 
fied affir wadr e or the loss of employees, and as so modi-
, me . 
[Cl'im. No. 4457. In Bank. Jan. 19, 1944.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. OSCAR L. ALBERTSON, 
" Appellant. 
(lJ ,Oriminai Law-Motive Whil th 'fiin~ispensable to a con;iction ; pr:o~r:;egn:~tfl'saotmhotiv? is nuf°t 
. Clent the ab f' erWlse s -
tion of':·, ., sence 0 a motIVe tends to SUpport the presump.· 
, " ' mnocence. . 
(2]!0~~~~!ppeal ;H.armless an~ Reversible Error-Evidence 
of vOlUlPinou~s:~ide:c: ~:~:~~utlOn for ~~rder, the admission c~nnection with an assault on th g dto SUSPdlCIOUS ~ccurrences in 
. . : ' , . e ecease some SIX weeks prior 
,I.' [I,J' See'70al.J,ur. 855; 14 Am.Jur. 786. 
<McX D' "R 
". .,' 19. eferences: [1] Criminal Law § 19' [ .. 
§ 264; [3] Criminal Law, §390' [4 5J C .'. ,2] HomICIde, 
§[6J Homicide, § 101i [7J Homi~ide' § 227:1m[~n~lJ LCa~, .§ 3193(1); 402&. . ,. " rlmma Law, 
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to his death was prejudicial error, where the connection of such 
occurrences with the defendant and with the crime charged 
was shown only by a theory of the prosecution based on cir-
cumstantial evidence, and where the evidence relating to the 
crime charged was also purely circumstantial. 
[3] Oriminal Law-Evidence-Other Crimes.-As a general rule, 
a defendant in a criminal prosecution can be tried for no offense 
other than that charged in the indictment or information; evi-
dence of collateral independent crimes is not admissible. 
[4] ld.-Evidence-Other Crimes-When Admissible.-Evidenee 
of other crimes may be admitted when it tends directly to 
establish the crime charged by proving a material fact, where 
it is part of the res gestae, or where it helps to disclose Illotive, 
intent, premeditation, guilty knowledge, malice, or a common 
plan or scheme. 
[5] ld.-Evidence-Other Orimes-Rules Governing Admissibility. 
-The trial court should be guided by the rule that proof of 
other crimes is to be received with extreme caution, and if its 
connection with .the crime charged is not clearly perceived, the 
doubt is to be resolved in favor of the accused, instead of suf-
fering the minds of the jurors to be prejudiced by an indepen-
dent fact, carrying with it no proper evidence of the particular 
guilt. 
[6] Homicide-Evidence-Other Crimes.-In a prosecution for 
murder, evidence of events relating to an assault on the de-
ceased some six weeks prior to his death failed to satisfy the 
requirements that a collateral offense cannot be put in evidence 
without proof that the accused was concerned in its commis-
sion, and that there must be identity of person or crime, sci-
enter, intent, system, or the like, showing that the person who 
committed the one crime must have committed the other, where 
the evidence introduced was insufficient to create more .than a 
mere suspicion that the defendant might have been the de-
ceased's assailant on the prior occasion. 
[7] ld.-Instructions-Evidence-Otlier Orimes.-In a prosecution 
,for murder, an instruction that evidence with regard to an 
assault on .the deceased some six weeks prior to his death was 
to be considered only as it wight relate to the relationship 
of defendant to the deceased, premeditation, malice or motive, 
was erroneous and misleading and invaded the province of the 
jury in not being qualified by a statement that before the 
jurors could consider the telltimony for the specified purposes, 
they must conclude that the deceased was assaulted on the 
prior occasion, where the evidence did not tend to prove the 
elements referred to in the instruction. 
[3] See 8 Oal.Jur. 58; 13 Oa1.Jur. 703; 20 Am.Jur. 287. 
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[8] Or?ninal Law:- Evidence - Other Orimes - Degree or Suf-
ficIency of E~I~ence.-Where evidence of a prior offense is 
pr?perly admISSIble under the exceptions to the general rule 
It IS not necessary to prove all of the elements of that offens~ 
beyond a reas?nabl~ doubt, as would be the case were the de-
fendant standmg trIal for it as well as for the crime charged. 
The proof? ~owe~er, must be sufficient to arouse more than 
m~re SUSpICIOn; It must. afford substantial evidence that the 
prIOr offense was in fact committed by the defendant. 
[9] Id.-Evid~nce-Othe.r Orimes-Degree or Sufficiency of Evi-
~ence.-:-CIrcum~tantI~1 proof of a crime charged cannot be 
mtermmgled. WIth circumstantial proof of suspicious prior 
occurrenc.es m such manner that it reacts as a psychological 
factor, WIth the result that the proof of the crime charged is 
used to bolster up the theory or foster suspicion that defen-
dant must have committed the prior act, and the conclusion 
that he must have committed the prior act is then used to 
strengthen the theory and induce the conclusion that he must 
also have committed the crime charged. 
APPE~L (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239) 
from a Judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 
County and from an order denying a new trial. Arthur 
Crum, JUdge. Reversed. 
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction reversed. 
John W. Preston for Appellant. 
Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, Frank Richards, 
Deputy Attorney General, John F. Dockweiler, District At-
torney, ~red N. Howser, District Attorney, John Barnes and 
W. E. SImpson, Deputies District Attorney, fOlr Respondent. 
. CARTER, J.-Upon evidence entirely circumstantial a 
Jury. f~und defendant Oscar L. Al'tJertson guilty of the crime 
of killIng John Kmetz by means of poisoned vitamin cap-s~es, and returned a verdict of murder in the first degree 
WIthout recommendation. Motion for new trial was denied 
and a judgment imposing the death penalty is automatically 
before thi~ court for review (Pen. Code, sec. 1239). 
. Ten. asslgnm,:nts .of error ~re argued in appellant's open-
Ing brIef, relatIng In the maIn to the sufficiency of the evi-
[8] See 20 Am.Jur. 299. 
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dence, rulings on admission of evidence, misconduct of the 
district attorney, and error in charging the jury. From the 
nature of the evidence and its doubtful sufficiency, it is 
obvious that if error was committed by the trial court which 
materially affected the substantial rights of the defendant, 
and which may have resulted in a miscarriage of justice, 
such error must be considered prejudicial and ground for 
reversal. (People v. Dail, 22 Ca1.2d 642, 650 [140 P.2d 828] ; 
People v. Silver, 16 Ca1.2d 714, 723 [108 P.2d 4].) For that 
reason it is necessary to detail the facts with particularity. 
Albertson was a blacksmith by trade. He and Mrs. Al-
bertson, to whom he had been married for twenty years, 
were active and apparently devout members of the Seventh 
Day Adventist Church. In the spring of 1935 they made 
the acquaintance of Miss Esther Dockham, who for about 
five years had been teaching in the denominational schools 
of the church. At first they saw her only very occasionally, 
but as the acquaintance gradually ripened into an intimate 
friendship they visited with her about once a month, cor-
responded with her when she was away, and after a year 
or so started calling at her home sometimes as often as once 
a week. She called Albertson "Unc" and the wife "Eva," 
and spent much of the visiting time studying and writing 
with Albertson on religious topics. 
In September, 1938, Miss Dockham accepted a contract 
to teach at the Exposition Park School in Los Angeles, and 
started to room with the Albertsons in San Pedro, sharing 
their living expenses. The Albertsons occupied a tent-house 
and she slept in their trailer. During the next year she con· 
tinued to teach at the same school but . lived in Los Angeles. 
However, she visited the Albertsons from time to time. In 
September, 1940, she commenced to teach at the East Los 
Angeles School, and met John Kmetz, the murder victim, 
soon afterward. He was a deacon of the Seventh Day. Ad-
ventist Church and was also a member of the board having 
charge of the school where she taught. She saw him from 
time to time at meetings of the school board and was also 
a visitor at his home. Twenty years her senior, he was 
fifty-two years of age and was a widower, having two chil-
dren, a boy and girl in their teens, with whom he resided 
in a small house at 4549 East Third Street, near the East 
Los Angeles School. He had regular and permanent em· 
ployment as a landscape gardener. 
'I. 
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In January, 1941, Miss Dockham and Kmetz started 
"keeping company." For several months she saw him fre-
quently, and almost weekly went with him and the children 
on an automobile trip, usually to visit her mother in North 
Hollywood. She tol<1 Mr. and Mrs. Albertson that Kmetz 
had proposed to her, and on one occasion when she and the 
Albertsons attended the East Los Angeles Church and Kmetz 
took up the collection she po;nted him out to them as the 
man who wanted to marry her. But in March or April she 
composed a proposGd letter to him stating: 
"Dear Bro. Kmetz. I intended to write you the first of 
the week but have been busy cleaning house and getting 
material ready for the 8th gr review. I have been thinking 
it over, & have decided not to go on the trip during your 
vacation. You said you wouldn't go unless I did. I know 
the children will be disappointed but I've made up my mind & 
I'm not changing it, so don't come & talk with me about it. 
If you really love your youngsters you will take them on a 
trip and all of you have a good time. If you would go some-
where and give them a good time, you would be happier 
yourself. Personally I care nothing for you. I never have, 
and I never can. It isn't your fault anymore thHI1 it is mine. 
You know everything was to be on a friends hi p basis. I've 
tried to act as if I enjoyed what you did for me and I've 
felt like a hypocrite for accepting things from you. I appre-
ciate what you have done, but please, I don't want to con-
tinue our friendship· as we have. I'd rather it would be 
as it was when school first started. You say that there is 
probably some reason for all this. Yes, there is, and I'm 
telling you straight to your face instead of behind your back. 
As I said before, I appreciate all you've done for me but I 
don't care anything about ·you and I do not find pleasure 
anymore in being with you, in fact I dOl'! 't enjoy being with 
you. It's been almost like a punishment for me the last few 
times I've been with you and the family. It all started with 
the Sunday we went to the mts. I didn't want to go, but 
forced myself to, because I said I would go, but I just don't 
want to put myself through it anymore. Guess I'm selfish. 
When you don't like a person, or I should say, when you 
don't care for a person, and it is anything but a pleasure 
to be with them, then why go with them? I just can't make 
myself go on a trip with you when I feel that I don't care 
about you. I can't explain the feeling I have when I'm with 
Jan. 1944] PEOPLE V. ALBERTSON 
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you but it makes me dislike you instead of liking you. You 
hav~ done nothing to make me feel this way so don't blame 
yourself. I'd rather you didn't send me anymore candy 
or ask me to go anywhere with you and the youngsters. I'd 
rather you wouldn't come and talk to me about it, either; 
and I'd rather you wouldn't tell the children. 1 don't want· 
to discuss it with you or Lola, or anyone. . .. Now don't 
sulk and get blue & discouraged. Just go on as you did. be~ 
fore you knew me. Take the children & have a good tIme. 
You have gotten along without a woman for 5 yrs.& I guess 
you'll have to get along for a while longer unless you ~an 
find someone else. Please don't think I'm angry and t1'ymg 
to hurt your feelings. I'm not. I'm trying to tell you ~n as 
nice a way as 1 can, that I don't want to go on the trIp or 
anywhere else with you. You've been ki~d, almost too kind, 
but I haven't appreciated it the way a smgle woman should; 
1 guess. 1 told you from the 1st that 1 was affectionate, but 
somehow or other I never felt that way toward the men, a~d 
1 don't feel the least bit affectionate toward you. 1 WIsh 
when you see me ... that you would ignore me. Several have 
said from time to time that no matter where 1 sit in church, 
a meeting, or a party, that you spe.nt most of you:: time look-
ing & smiling at me. To a certam extent that IS true & .1 
don't like it. I don't know why it should bother me, but It 
does. Please understand this note, & forget me. I'm just an-
other woman who doesn't appreciate a man's attentions. Re-
spectfully yours,Esther D.". . 
After writing this intended letter MISS Dockham felt It 
was too harsh and composed a second one, stating substan-
tially the same thing in softer language, an? mailed it. to 
Kmetz. While searching the Albertson traIler the pohce 
found the quoted letter in a drawer. The Albertsons had 
previously encouraged Miss Dockham to marry, and she stated. 
that if she liad showed them the letter Albertson would have 
scolded her. 
School closed the latter part of May, and during the first 
week of June Albertson called for Miss Dockham at her 
home in Los Angeles and drove her to the Albertsons' home 
in San Pedro. This was in response to an invitation which 
had previouslS been extended by both Mr. and Mrs. Albert-
son. Albertson was out of work and was attending a weld-
ing. school at Redondo Beach. In August, just ahout the 
time she was ending her visit with the Albertsons and re-
1 
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turning to her home in Los Angeles, she saw Kmetz to talk 
to him for the first time since writing him the letter reject-
ing his advances. The conversation took place while she and 
the Albertsons were attending a church camp meeting at 
Lynwood. A few days later, when back in Los Angeles 
staying with her brother, she saw Kmetz at his home, and 
later, while driving with him, discussed marriage. She ex-
plained that her harsh attitude arose out of her belief that 
he did not really love her but wanted to marry her so he 
would have a good housekeeper, and that she wrote the let-
ter as a test of his feeling. He renewed his proposal and 
she promised to marry him. She immediately advised the 
. Albertsons by a postal card dated August 14th, reading as 
follows: 
"Dear Maw and Paw-Prepare for a shock-Mr. Kmetz 
and I are to be married Monday night I I expect to be down 
Sun. so I can get most of my things. Eva, would you enjoy 
fixing my hair for the occasion Y Of course I want you both 
& Charlene to come to the wedding. Only a choice few are 
invited. I will tell you more about it Sunday. He doem't 
want me to teach, but if the board can't get a teacher on such 
short notice then of course I feel it my duty to teach until 
they can get some one. Love until Sun. morn. Esther. Just 
he and I will come. Will have dinner with you. Will bring 
ice cream." 
On Sunday the two went to the Albertsons as planned, 
and Kmetz and Albertson were introduced. So far as known 
they had never before met formally. The arrangements for 
the marriage ceremony were discussed and Albertson accepted 
an invitation to give the bride away. He reminded Miss 
Dockham that Kmetz was twenty years her senior and had 
two children, but advised her, if she loved him, to go ahead 
and marry. The wedding took place according to plan be-
tween 8 :00 and 8 :30 of the evening of August 18th at the 
home of Dr. and Mrs. Groton, of Norwalk, who were related 
by marriage to Kmetz. Miss Dockham's mother, who had 
agreed to come if she could, was unable to attend, but her 
brother was there, also the Albertsons, the minister and his 
wife, and a girl hired to serve refreshments. Mr. Albertson 
gave the bride away. 
Subsequent to the marriage the Albertsons and the 
Kmetzes continued their friendship and visited with each 
other on an average of about once a week. Mr. Kmetz and 
Mr. Albertson seemed to be friendly. Mrs. Kmetz testified 
Jan. 1944] PEOPLE v. ALBERTSON [23 C.2d 55G] 
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that at the time of the marriage she was in love with K~letz, 
and was not then and had never before, nor had she smce, 
been in love with any other man. With reference to the 
statement in the letter which she wrote Kmetz prior to the 
marriage, "Now don't sulk and get blue.& dis.coura~ed," she 
testified that Mr. Kmetz was in the habIt of llldulgmg these 
moods and quite frequently both before and after their mar-
riage he had spells of melancholia and depression, probably 
more than a dozen times after the marriage. He told ~er 
that they were caused by the way his son acted toward hIm, 
that "he acted so disrespectful and so ugly and hateful, and 
swore at him and treated him in such a way that he felt 
the boy had no love in his heart for him at all." After the 
marriage Mrs. Kmetz witnessed occasions when the boy, Ray-
mond then seventeen abused and swore at his father. 
In ~ar1y October, about six weeks after the m~rriage, Mrs. 
Albertson wrote Mrs. Kmetz, inviting her to ViSIt them over 
the week end of October 10th. As a reason for the invitation 
she stated that they expected to move away soon, and it might 
be the last chance Mrs. Kmetz would have to be with them a~d 
to pack up and take back the belongings whi~h she had left III 
their home. On October 8th Mrs. Kmetz maIled a postal card 
of acceptance, which read: "Dear Folks-I can .come for the 
week end. I will be ready when Unc comes FrIday. I sup-
pose some of your news includes Dorothy a:r;td her baby. I 
hope she is satisfied now that she has a chIld of her own. 
'Well I wanna know!' See you Friday. Love, Esther.". 
Although Mr. Kmetz was blue and depressed on FrIday 
morning, October 10th, after Mrs. Kmetz told him she w~s 
going to the Albertsons for the week end, she ma?e the trIp 
with his full and complete consent. He and the childre~ were 
home when Mr. Albertson called for her ab~ut 5 :30 III the 
afternoon, and she left with Albertson immedIately. On Sat-
urday October 11th she and the Albertsons attended church 
at In~lewood. On' Sunday, October 12th, she packed her 
things and' in the evening the Albertsons drove her homp.. 
They arrived about seven o'clock ~nd Mr. Kmetz was not 
there' but he came in about five mIllutes later .. He w~ no longe~ blue and depressed but had an appearance of satIsfa~ 
tion pleasure, and happiness. Mr. and Mrs. Albertson sta.ye 
for twenty or twenty-five minutes and then left. ' . 
During the absence of Mrs. Kmetz, on Saturday the. 11th, 
Mr. Kmetz and the two childrt>u had a1;tended church III tb.e 
.; i 
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morning, returning home about one in the afternoon. When 
they got up to the door the boy picked up a small package 
and some letters which the mailman had delivered during 
their absence, and handed them to his sister, who in turn 
handed them to Mr. Kmetz. The package purported to come 
from the "Herb Specialty Co., 1436 N. Wilcox Ave., Holly-
wood," and bore a Hollywood post office cancellation stamp 
dated October 10th, 3 :30 p. m. Later investigation showed 
that the company named was unknown at the given address, 
which was a building unoccupied between October 1st and 
15th. One of the letters likewise purported to come from the 
same nonexistent company, but with an address given as "P.O. 
Box 231 Hollywood, CaL," and it was postmarked at Los 
Angeles, October 10, 5 :00 p. m. The subscriber to this box 
number was Bireley's, Incorporated, a beverage concern. 
Upon taking the letter and package from his daughter, Mr. 
Kmetz set them on the chest of drawers in the front bedroom 
leading to the kitchen, which was the bedroom occupied by 
him and Mrs. Kmetz. Later on, while the father and daughter 
were having their midday dinner, the son having gone out of 
the house, Mr. Kmetz opened the package and found that it 
contained twelve capsules, although there were compartments 
for fifteen. Two of the capsules were dark and the other ten 
light. The box was about three inches long and two inches 
wide, with a white top alid bottom and orange sides. The 
capsules were held in place by holes or compartments punched 
in two cardboard trays, and a layer of cotton on top. In addi-
tion to the capsules the box contained a letterhead bearing 
the name of "The Herb Specialty Co.-Nature's Vitamins 
extracted from plant life,' and the typewritten statement: 
"Follow Directions Closely 2 Dark Capsules at bedtime. 1 
Light Capsule before breakfast Daily." 
The letter was also written on the same printed letterhead 
of "The Herb Specialty Co. P. O. Box 231 Hollywood, Calif.," 
was dated September 24, 1941, and was signed "The Herb 
Specialty Company. Dr. W. W. Mackelroy, Mgr." The 
signature "Dr. W. W. Mackelroy" was written in ink but 
looked as though it might have been traced, and the penman-
ship was no better than that of a child. The letter itself was 
well worded and contained two pages, single spaced, of adver-
tising data. After the salutation "Dear Friend" it stated: 
"We are selecting a limited number of men in variollS locali-
ties in and about Los Angeles who have reached the age of 
Jan. 1944] PEOPLE v. ALBERTSON 
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forty or more whom we believe, without any hesitancy, need 
healthful help. This help is coming to you absolutely free of 
charge through the use of 'vitalizing. vitamin vigor.' Please 
read this entire letter and then let these vitalizing vitamins 
put spring in your step." Seven paragraphs followed, ext.ol-
ling the virtues of vitamins and promising that I. The story 
of how this marvelous discovery was obtained from one of the 
oldest Indian tribes in South America by one of the world"s 
most famous doctors" would be mailed about October 15th.; 
"Here is our plan," the letter concluded, "We are sending 
you, under separate cover, a ten days supply of our 'vitaliz-
ing vitamin vigor' at no cost to you. Follow the simple ,direc--: 
tions carefully and when this supply is exhaus~d, 1f you are" 
satisfied with the amazing results, send us ten names of men. 
that you believe would be benefited by the use of ~vitalizing 
vitamin vigor' and for your trouble and benefit we will send; 
you free of charge a 30 days supply. We believe this way is 
the best and cheapest advertising and a splendid method of; 
helping each other including the other fellow. ' ... P. S. We 
will also have a fine product of blended herbs for women enter-
ing or going through the change of life, when our new labora~' 
tory opens on or about October 20th." ' . 
After looking at the letter and the box of capsules, while, 
sitting at the dinner table. Mr. Kmetz again set them on the 
chest of drawers in the bedroom. His daughter noticed, as 
she passed through the house, that they remained there. all 
day. She testified to a conversation which she had with her 
brother about his having examined them during the day. That 
evening the brother went out to a party and she went to the 
boulevard with her father. Her brother came in at two o'clock 
in the morning. She fixed the time because his quarreling 
with the father woke her up. She said her father "socked" 
her brother, and that: "It waR over Mother. Q. And by 
Mother you mean Mrs. Esther Kmetz? A. Yes. Q. And 
what was said ~ A. Oh, about, on the order that he hadn't been 
acting right, and that he didn't do what she said, and he 
should be more obedient. It was on that order. Q. And 
what did Ray say just before your father slapped him or 
socked him as you recall it? A. I don't remember. Q. Have 
you told us all you know about that quarrel now, Lola' 
A. Yes." 
The capsules also remained on the chest of drawers all of 
the following day, October 12th, and were there when the' 
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Albertsons brought Mrs. Kmetz home about seveu 0 'clock in 
the evening. The arrival of the package and letter was not 
discussed with them; but the daughter testified that she picked 
them up from the chest of drawers and "showed them to 
Mother and Mrs. Albertson," and she testified, "Maybe I said 
See what Daddy has got for his birthday. I don't remem-
ber." The birthday was to occur on October 18th. At the 
time of the conversation just referred to, Mr. Albertson was 
engaged in bringing in Mrs. Kmetz' things from the automo-bile. 
Mrs. Kmetz took the package and letter and looked at them 
and set them back on the chest of drawers. In about five min: 
utes Mr. Kmetz arrived and the subject was not mentioned 
again until after the Albertsons left. Mrs. Kmetz testified: 
' , Well, after the Albertsons left my husband put his car up 
and I was out there with him while he did it. We went back 
into the house; Raymond was working with something at-
in the room that he occupied; Lola had finished her ironing 
and said she did not feel very good and wanted to know if I 
minded if she went to bed instead of sitting up for the eve-
ning worship with us, and I told her perhaps she had better 
go to bed. Before she went my husband asked if I had seen the 
letter that came through the mail with the medicine and I 
told him I did not know if he had received any mail with it." 
Mr. Kmetz then told his wife about the letter. She sat on 
the edge of the bed and read it aloud to him, and then laid it 
back on the chest of drawers. The letter, she testified, did not 
at that time bear the Mackelroy signature looking as it later 
appeared, nor the word "Dr." preceding the name. At the 
time of trial the signature looked to her as though it had been 
traced over one which was originally written by a better pen. 
man. 
After the letter was read, both spouses continued with their 
preparations for bed, meanwhile discussing the events of the 
week end. After Mr. Kmetz had put on his pajamas and 
emerged from the bathroom, the two had evening worship. 
Then they sat on the bed and talked for a while. He stepped 
in the bathroom again and then asked Mrs. Kmetz if she 
thought he should take the medicine. She said: "Oh, I told 
him from what we had read in the letter, that it assured us 
that it could not do any possible harm, so I guessed if he took 
them it certainly could not harm him in any way." Again, 
she said: "Well, I thought it was some kind of spring tonic, 
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and I guess he did too, because we discussed it. fr0t?- that 
standpoint. He was unusually well and st:ong for hIS age, 
and we .wondered why anybody would thmk. he needed a 
t · Well I told him from what we read m the letter-onIC. . . . , . h ' I ess 
I said 'It certainly couldn't do a person any arm, so gu. 
it wouldn't hurt him maybe if he took them." She ~ad p,reVld 
ously read the directions" 2 Dark Capsules at be?t1me, an 
had noted that two of the capsules were darker m color and 
larger than the others. 
Mr Kmetz thereupon picked up the box of capsules and 
went' into the kitchen. He called back· asking how to take 
1 Mrs Kmetz told him to swallow them and take a capsu es. . d h 
drink of water afterwards, and she heard. a s9Ull snc as 
would be made by drawing water and ~~~cmg a g~ass ~n t~; 
. k Mr Kmetz immediately said that It made hIm dIZZY. ~~ ~ame 'into the bedroom, put the window up, fell back. on 
the bed, let out a "horrible groan" and started bre~thm.g 
very heavily and noisily and frothing at th? mouth,. WIth hIS 
eyes seeming to bulge. Mrs. Kmetz .wiped hIS face WIth a ~e~ 
rag and tried to administer other aId. In about fifteen mm 
utes shortly after 9 :15 o'clock, she called Dr. Vern?n Ingle, 
who' pumped out the contents of the stoma~h. A? mhalator 
squad then arrived, but artificial respiratIon faIled and at 
10 ·35 p. m., Mr. Kmetz was pronounced dead. . A radio patrol officer, Edward M. Crum, took the radIO call 
for the inhalator squad and arrived at the house about the 
same time as the squad. Two neighbors, M:r. and Mrs. Mc· 
Gill were in the living room. Mr. Crum testIfied that as long 
as he was in the house "Mrs. Kmetz was very calm and very 
collected. She was even more or less joking wi~h Mr. and 
Mrs McGill. She treated the whole matter very hg~tly. S~e 
h . d no emotion at all. I paid particular attentIon to It, ~e~::se I thought that it was rather strange.", Mr. Crum ~as 
there nntil after midnight, when the coroner s representatIve 
. d Mrs Kmetz showed him the letter, box of capsules 
arrIve . . b h' h he 
and directions, and also the wrapper on the ox ':' IC ~ 
cxtracted from the trash can. Dr. I~gle ~lso testIfie~t . at 
Mrs. Kmetz was "very calm and. cool whl!e ~e was ~ ~m. 
. t' to her husband and inqUIred, as artIfiCIal respIratIon IS ermg . d to" b · t 'ed "Do you think he IS dea ye, . was emg rl , d d l\{r 
After Dr. Ingle had pron~unc.ed Mr. Kmetz ea .: 
Crum started to make an investIgatIon and to gather w~at e~ 
dence he could. He talked with Mrs. Kmetz and durmg t e 
, 
! 
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I 
I 
I 
562 PEOPLE v. ALBERTSON [23 C.2d 
course of the conversation got the Mackelroy letter from her. 
He folded the letter and laid it under his uniform cap on top 
of the piano. A short time later he found the letter in Mrs. 
Kmetz' possession again, at which time she returned it to him 
at his request, and he then put it in his pocket. The envelope 
in which the letter arrived was retrieved from the McGills, 
who for some reason had carried it home. 
The autopsy report was that Mr. Kmetz died from cyanide 
poisoning, and the lack of corrosion in the oral cavity of his 
throat indicated that it had been swallowed rapidly in some 
vehicle with a protective covering like a capsule. This poison 
gives off an odor of bitter almonds, which was noticed by both 
Dr. Ingle and Mrs. Kmetz while they were administering aid. 
"Cyanogas" is used in agricultural work, mining, and pest 
control, and is procurable at any drug store, feed and seed, 
or hardware store in the United States. No prescription or 
signing of the poison register is required in making the pur-
chase. In color the poison is dark gray, and it is composed 
of small particles-a material of about the same color and 
form as the contents of the two dark capsules. About half 
the amount contained in one of the capsules would be suf-
ficient to kill an average 150-pound man in about thirty 
minutes. 
On Monday, October 13th, the day after the death, Mrs. 
Kmetz went to school in the morning but returned home in the 
afternoon, and then went to the Albertsons in the evening. 
They were not home when she arrived, but came in after she 
had retired. She told them about the death of Mr. Kmetz, 
and they appeared to be sorry and upset, as any friends would 
be on hearing bad news. Mr. Albertson seemed to be as much 
upset as Mrs. Albertson, and promised that they would both 
"stick by" and help out until everything was taken care of. 
The following day the Albertsons returned home with Mrs. 
Kmetz and lived there with her until Mr. Albertson was ar-
rested and charged with the murder. Mrs. Albertson con-
tinued on, and was still living there with Mrs. Kmetz several 
months later when the cause was first called for trial. 
. On the first trial Mrs. Kmetz testified as a witness for the 
People, and Mr. Albertson took the witness stand in his own 
behalf. The jury disagreed, and six weeks later the cause 
came on for retrial. Mrs. Kmetz could not then be found, 
although diligent search was made. However, the testimony 
which she had given un the first trial was read to the jury. 
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witness stand but stood on, his 
Mr. Albertson did not tak.e the lffered nO evidence at all 
plea of not guilty, and hIS counse 0 
in his behalf. . neet Mr. Albertson with the 
The evidence purportmg to con I circumstantial, and con-
crime as already stated, w~s pnre y , 
. ' . I f the followmg: 22 
slsted mam y. 0 M' testified that on September, . 
A printer In Santa .0D1~ and placed an ordt>r for 1000 
1941 a man called at hIS s op . 1t Company "and pursu-lette~heads for "The Her: Sle::rey printed, o;e of which the 
an! to th~ ord~r the le~~: l:~terhead received by Mr. Kme~. 
prmter ldentlfied. as. h and the cnstomercall,~d for It 
The work was paId for m ?as '. d about multigraphmg and 
on September 24th. .He mi~~r~etter Shop in SantaMo,?,ica. 
the printer referred hIm to Albertson the prmter 
. 'd ffy the customer as "f In refusmg to 1 en 1" Q But at this time you can not Identl y 
testified as follows: . h as the man who made that 
Mr. Albertson, the defendant eret, He resembles a person I 
, A No I can no . ," Q M 
order, can you . , I would not say where.. . 1:. 
have seen somewhere, but th n the man, you have de-
Albertson is a much larger m;n ~d ay that he is a little 
Scribed is he not 7 A. Well, wou s ", 
, • " ! 
lighter in weIght. Th Letter Shop testified that on Sep-
A stenographer at e r o'clock she typed the 
tember 24th betwe~n three;:~~~z (Ex. 15)., She did the 
two-page letter recelVed by . . d to whether she saw d when questlone as, d "A typing for a man, an h mbled him, she state, , . 
that man in court, or one w 01 res~ Q And where is the man 
One who resembl~s him verio:e~se ihe ~an for whom you did 
that resembles hIm veryc nda~t Mr. Albertson." About ,a 
that typing? A. The defe the man returned and ordered, 
Week after she typed the lette:, raphed copies of a one-page h d 500 mlmeog.· ' on the same letter ea , dvertising "vitalizing .V1tanun 
letter, dated Oct~ber 3, 1941, !enerous supply absolutely free 
vigor " and offermg to send a t:> lIed to the funeral of Mr. 
, " 1 When she was ca 'd t'£y for ten days trIa. there she could 1 en 1 
Kmetz and asked if there was anYtonethe office she "thought" 
'bl on that came 0 '. . as the pOSSl e pers l' fi d "I wasn't positive. . . . 
she identified him there, but tes \:er of having seen the man 
The impression I had was oue ra 'ly l'n the Letter ShoP." At b t not necessarl . . ed somewhere before, u typed the customer lnqulr 
the time the two-page letter ~as the stenographer asked him 
about mimeographing and ; e~, he said not at the time, that 
if he wished to place au or er 
'. 
j~ ,'; , ~ 
!~ 
; i: 
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he wanted to show this letter I was typing to some olie, and 
that he would take it out of the office, and would bring back 
a copy to be mimeographed. And there was not much other 
conversation. " After the death of Mr. Kmetz, and on the 
Monday before the inquest, the stenographer saw a man walk 
through the Arcade who looked "vaguely familiar." She 
walked to the door to look at him again, and he turned back 
into the street. She had a "strange premonition" that he 
was going to return, and look in again. He did so, and had 
part of his face covered with his hand over his eye; "He 
peered in and walked on." Although she had thus had more 
than one occasion to consider the identity of the customer, 
she could not identify him positively at the inquest as Albert-
son, but stated: "Not positively, but they resemble each 
other." 
. Mrs. Harris, the proprietor of The Letter Shop, also talked 
WIth the customer eoncerning the order for mimeographing 
the 500 letters. He left the order on October 2nd, wanted the 
work rushed, and called for it On October 3rd. In the court-
room Mrs. Harris identified the customer as Albertson. She 
was asked: "Q. I will ask you if you will look around the 
courtroom and see whether or not you can identify here any 
person that is the person you saw in your shop on October 
2nd and October 3rd, who placed the order for the mimeo-
graphed sheets? A. Yes, Mr. Albertson. Q. Do you recog-
nize him as the man who placed the order? A. Yes. Q. And 
the man who received delivery? A. Yes." On cross-examina_ 
tion it was brought out that Mrs. Harris had attended the 
funeral of Mr. Kmetz, but was not then so sure of her identifi-
cation. She was asked: "Q. And at the funeral did you see 
any person whom you recognized as the same person who 
had been in your office and transacted the business and re-
ceived the mimeograph from you on October 2nd and October 
the 3rd Y A. Yes, I saw this person, but I wanted to be more 
sure and wanted to see him again without his glasses and to 
hear him talk. Q. In other words, when you saw him at the 
funeral he was wearing glasses? A. Yes. Q. And when you 
saw him at the inquest he was not? A. Yes. Q. And was he 
wearing glasses when he was in your office on October 2nd and 
October the 3rd Y A. No." It also appeared on cross-exam-
ination that Mr. Albertson's appearance did not tally in all 
respects with the desc:ription Mrs. Harris had originally given 
of her customer. 
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Mrs. Souther, a public stenographer in Hollywood, tes~ified. 
that on the morning of October 9, 1941, a man whom she Iden-
tified in the courtroom as Albertson appeared at her office and 
gave her a penciled list of names and an order t~ address 
twenty-one envelopes. He waited for them and paId her 45 
cents. During the fifteen minutes he was in her ?ffice he was 
observed by another customer. This custo~e: test~:6.ed ~hat the 
man in the office resembled Albertson. HIS Identification was 
not positive. He stated: "I can't tell you I am absolutely 
sure, because truly I am not absolutely sure. I ha~e a stron~ 
impression and I had the impression that I saw hIm th.ere. 
Mrs. Souther remembered the name '~K~etz" on the hst of 
names given her because of its peculIarIty and als~ b~cause 
th b tone" K" on the list. Typewriter tests mdlcated 
ere was u h ddressed that the envelope received by Kmetz was t e one a 
by::rtrace of any "W. W. Mackelroy," the sign~r of the 
1 tter could be found. A handwriting expert testI~ed that 
e , f h' d' t d SIgnature "the characteristics and features 0 t IS ISpU e . . 
'th the admitted handwritings of Albertson to a compare WI . bl t . ty 
degree that would indicate to me the reasona . e cer ~m 
that the Albertson handwritings and the questIOned SIg~a­
ture were both written by the same person," and anot er 
expert gave similar testimony. " 
On one occasion while Mrs. Kmetz was staying WIth. the 
Albertsons in the summer of 1941, prior to . her. marrIage, 
she asked Mr. Albertson to buy her some Vlt~mIn A cap-
les at the drug store. He purchased and delIvered to her 
:u box of Pro-Vite capsules, which she took, and wh~n her 
. 't over she left the box in the Albertson traIler or VISI was "'1 'f 
about the premises. This box, she ~estI:6.ed, was SImI ar, 1 
ot identical with a Pro-Vite capsule box. (Peo. Ex. 11) ~hich was p;ocured by prosecuting officers from the S~n~ag 
drug store, and contained two pasteboard trays contammg 
perforations or holes for forty round, black capsules and 
forty round orange capsules. 
The box c~ntaining the poison capsules bore no resembl.ance 
whatsoever to the box purchased at the drug store, eIther 
in size, shape, or appearance, except that the drug store b~x 
was entirely covered with orange-colored paper, w~~reas ~h e 
other box had a strip of orange paper around ~e SI es. d e 
latter seemed obviously to be a homemade affaIr. The rug 
store box had trays accommodating eighty capsules, the home-
.. 
ii 
Ii I; 
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made box a tray accommodating fifteen. One of the hand-
writing experts, however, testified that the holes in the trays, 
of both boxes were of the same size and were the same un-
equal distances apart, and he undertook to demonstrate to 
the jury that the tray from the homemade box matched one 
area of the tray from the drug store box. An analysis of 
tiny particles of paste taken from the homemade box was 
also said to show the same chemical content as that of a bot-
tle of mucilage, of five and ten-cent store variety, found by 
officers in the Albertson trailer on October 22nd. Traces of 
orange color were also said to have been found on the rubber 
squeegee of the mucilage bottle. 
The capsules themselves were entirely different. Those in 
the drug store box were in the form of a round manufac-
tured translucent pill, resembling a small glass marble. Those 
in the homemade box were made of the familiar purchasable, 
colorless, oblong, telescopic capsules. The capsules had been 
IDled with small greenish gray and black particles resem-
bling grass seed, or dry grass or herbs chopped up finely. 
Mrs. Kmetz testified that her husband had various kinds of 
medicine around the house and she had seen capsules for 
colds. 
In considering the sufficiency of this evidence to prove 
the gUilt of Albertson, it is pertinent to note the startling 
fact that no motive whatsoever is shown. Pure speculation 
that there may have been a romantic attachment between 
Albertson and Mrs. Kmetz is met by the fact that the evi-
dence without contradiction contains every indication to the 
contrary. The long marriage of the Albertsons, the fact that 
they both welcometi Mrs. Kmetz to their home, and the close 
and intimate friendship existing between the two women, 
show a relationship which in reasonable, probability would 
not have endured over a period of years before, and con. 
tinued after the Kmetz marriage I'lnd murder, had there been 
a meretricious attachment between Albertson and Mrs. 
Kmetz. Neither is there any evidence from which it could 
be intimated or inferred that Mrs. Kmetz was unhappy in 
her marriage to a degree which would lead Albertson, out 
of loyal friendship, to attempt to put the husband out of the 
way. So far as is shown or can be inferred, the family life 
of the two couples was harmonious and their continuing 
friendship was sincere. Betterment of living conditions 
could scarcely have been the motive of Albertson, for the 
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b ' par with the Albert· Kmetz house was apparently Ii out on a 
son trailer-tent home. . 't be conceded furnishes but 
[1] The absence of .motIv~, I may . r in c~nnection with 
one elemen~ for conslder~tlO~ by ~:e ;:1 if proof of guilt is 
the other Clrcu~tances In t e ca th resumption of inno-
otherwise suffiCIent to oVter:;a~~ co~vfcted notwithstanding 
cence the defendant mus theless .. absence of 
. h b shown But never , 
no motIve as een . 't' f innocence" (Peo-d t pport the presump Ion 0 d 
motive ten s 0 su I 315 328 [184 P. 389]), or as state 
ple v. Tom Woo, 181 C~8 C i 387 390-391' [281 P. 609], a 
hi People v. Kelley, 2 a. t" "The absence of proof I· d on by the prosecu lon, , " 
cl9.se re Ie up k d on the side of innocence. 
of motive is a fact to be .rec one'f 't be admitted as a prem-
Another striking f~ct .IS, ren 1 a~l the capsules to Kmetz 
ise that Albertson dId m act mvidence whatsoever that he ' 
there is a complete !ack of anYd ethe poison, or placed poison 
purchased or o~herwI~~ p~~~u:~ capsules was delivered at the 
in two of the pIlls. e midday on Saturday; October 
Kmetz home and openedh at h t of drawers in the bedroom, 
11th. It wa~ place~ on ~ ~uc ~Sthe house, and there it stayed 
a room used m passmg t r g 11 da Sunday and 
throughout the rem~inde; o~ Satu:~~~iO:k w~n Mrs. Kmetz 
Sunday evening until at eas se;~e ca sul~s were of the tele-
returned with t~e Albertsons. t' d a~d refilled by anyone. 
scopic type WhICh bcan b~ ~~t sI:aled ampoule variety they 
Had the capsules e~n 0 b 'ect to tampering, but they were 
could not have been t us S? J nd the poison used was one 
of the home-prepared varIety, a b of stores No tes. 
'1 able at any num er . f 
which is easl y procur dd ced to show that the contents (j 
timony whatsoever was a u tam ered with during the 
the capsules were not chan~ed t': Kr!tz home' or that the 
period the box stood ~pent I~he ~ailing of the 'package. , 
poison was inserted p~lOr 0 a sules with intent to mur~ 
If Alberts?n had p~lsonet t~le ctl~t he would have left so 
der Kmetz, It seems ~mp:;h a e:pect to his activities in pro-
wide and open a. t~all :~teri:l After completing the prep-
curing the advertIsmg , . h' h was mailed to Kmetz, 
. f th to-page letter w IC . f th 
aratIon 0 e w .. m ai designed to brmg or 
initiating an advertISI~g caap~ul:n purchasers, there was no 
the names of prospec lve Cd rrange for the mimeographing 
reason for, him to return an ad rtisement or to go to still 
00 . of a shorter a ve , t ed 
of 5 COPI~ f b siness to have envelopes yp , another publIc place 0 U 
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thus opening the way for his multiple identification in case 
of detection. On the other hand, if· these activities were car-
ried out by someone "resembling" Albertson with deliberate 
intent to kill Kmetz and cast suspicion o~ Albertson the transaction~ could not have been more cunningly arra~ged 
to accomplIsh the foul purpose. If Albertson did in fact 
prepare and mail the capsules, but unknown to him two of 
them were poisoned by another, this would logically explain 
the openness with which he conducted his early activities 
and a later attempt to conceal and deny them. The evidence 
indicates convincingly that Albertson himself did not have 
the educational qualifications which would make him capable 
of composing the advertising material. 
On motion for new trial, Albertson in protesting his inno-
cence, informed the trial court that he had wished to take 
the stand in his Own behalf, as at the first trial, and that 
he fe!t he could have put on a defense which was beyond 
questIOn. 
[2] To strengthen its case, and over vigorous protests of 
Albertson's counsel, the prosecution offered and was per-
mitted to introduce hundreds of pages of testimony relating 
to strange happenings on the night of AUQUst 30 1941. If 
the admission of this evidence was erroneo"'us, the' error was 
clearly prejudicial because of the overwhelminO' volume of 
such testimony, comprising a major portion of the transcript 
on appeal, and also because of the doubtful and circumstan-
tial nature o~ the evidence as a whole. (People v. Dail, supra; 
People v. S1lver, supra.) This evidence was admitted for 
consideration by the jury, as limited by the court's instruc-
tion as follows: "You are further instructed that the defen-
dant is not on trial in this case for any crime connected with 
an assault upon John Kmetz on or about the 30th of AuO'ust 
1941. The evidence with regard to the transactions of AuOgus~ 
30th, 1941 are to be considered by you only as the same may 
relate to the matter of the relationship of the defendant to 
John Kmetz, the matter of premeditation the matter of mal-. , 
Ice or the matter of motive. Such evidence may not be con-
sidered by y?u for any other purpose." On appeal, however, 
the prosecutIOn took the position that: "It is our contention 
that the evidence relating to the assault of August 30 1941 
was admissible here under the rule of common sch~me 0: 
plan, which in turn tended to connect appellant with the 
commission of the crime charged in the indictment. • •• The 
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jury was entitled from the evidence to conclude th~t each 
plan was conceived by a mind disposed toward deceptIOn and 
secrecy." (Resp. Br. 114.) 
This voluminous evidence of the strange occurrences of 
August 30th shows the following: On Saturday, August 30, 
1941 twelve days after the Kmetz marriage, Mr. and Mrs. Km~tz and the daughter went to visit the mother of Mrs. 
Kmetz in North Hollywood. They arrived home at 10 :20 in 
the evening. The time is fixed definitely because they found 
on their return that the son had left a note in the door say-
ing he had gone down on the boulevard with a boy friend 
and would be home by 11 0 'clock. This note caused Mrs. 
Kmetz to look at her watch, which read 10 :20. On approach-
ing the house they had seen parked aro.und t~e corner an old 
model automobile, which Mrs. Kmetz, III tryIng to report to 
the police later described as a car which "looked like the 
car my u~cle drove." She refused absolutely to identify it 
as Albertson's car. After the Kmetz car pulled up in front 
of their garage, which was located near the sid;walk, with 
the house in the rear of the lot, Mr. Kmetz carrIed the gro-
ceries into the house and Mrs. Kmetz and the daughter en-
tered with him. In a few minutes Mr. Kmetz went out to 
put the car away. Mrs. Kmetz and the daughter heard a 
noise or muffled cry. They rushed out to the front porch 
and the daughter heard her father cry, "Stop, thief, "or 
some words like that. They saw Mr. Kmetz in the vacant 
lot just east of the house. He was very excited, and upon 
reentering the house they found that his hat was cut in tw:o 
places his head was bruised and cut, but not deeply, and hIS 
ear h~d been pulled away from his head. Although there 
was light at the intersection and Mr. Kmetz was not knocked 
out by the first blow but was able to grapple with hi~ ass~il­
ant and ward off subsequent blows, he ~~uld no~ Ide~tIfy 
the assailant. If the assailant was the famlhar ~amlly fr~en~, 
Albertson it seems he should have been recognIzed. Wlthlll 
a few mi~utes after the assault, the lights went on and off 
on the car parked around the corner and it moved away. 
The following morning Mr. Kmetz show:ed Mrs .. Kmetz a 
bent pickax handle which he said he had pIcked up III the lot. 
Shortly before, or at approximately the ti?Ie of. the assault, 
that is, at approximately 10 :15 p. m., radIO polIceman ~el­
logg saw an automobile driven b~ a man ru~ at fort~-five mlles 
an hour through a traffic stop SIgn at an llltersectlOn located 
I 
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about four blocks from the K t ~" ----
after proceeding for more th me z ~~me. He gave chase and 
doned and empty exce t tha:r: a mI e. he found the car aban. 
personal effects Th· P It contamed clothing and other 
h . 18 was at 10 ·22 I· s owed that the car .. p. m. nvestIgation 
Albertson and that th was regIstered in the name of Mrs 
out on th~ back seat ~:r::tsona\ e~~cts, clothing neatly laid 
cles and a postal card (E 3~on ammg a?out $2.00, specta-
belonged to Albertson ";her' later herem described), etc., 
chased by the officer ~a th e was no proof that the car 
Kmetz. There is also a :ime e dfar used by th~ assailant of 
was committed between 10 .20 sc~epancy, for If the assault 
by ~he Kmetz family, the as~aila~~ co1~~25 p. m.! as testified 
perIod have been driving his c u not .durIng the same 
Kmetz home, and the car coul ar at some dIstan.ce from the 
the officer at 10 :22. d not have been pIcked up by 
Between midnight of th· . 
1:00 o'clock of the .e samfe evemng, August 30th and 
Allum and Cox in mornIng 0 August 31st, police officers 
G ,response to a telepho 11 to arnet and Soto Streets d. ne ca , proceeded 
one-tenth miles from th l' a Istance of about three and 
the abandoned car. The p ~~ where officer Kellogg' found 
half reclining position o:r:h ey :aw Albertson lying in a 
hands. He was clad onl in ~iPar way ~ith his head on his 
and was suffering from ~e' ol~ undershIrt, shorts and socks, 
police station and gave him :om~ c~~~ took him back to the 
of hot water. After a short mg and a glass Or two 
story, which was that he too r~s~ he was able to tell them his 
appears to have been ~orse' t: undergone an ordeal which 
seemed incredible to the offi an that of Kmetz. His tale 
it, but had him dictate a f~~r:, and .they refused to believe 
A!bertson's story was as fo~fo~WI:Itt~n report (Ex. 102). 
receIved in the mail a ostal s. n August 29th he 
lows: "Dear AI-Ho p ld card. (Ex. 30) reading as fol-
a friend of mine abou~ ;~; .rou hke to be a villiage smithy 
a smith and asked me to try ~~~sfi:o;th of L?s Angeles need~ 
will be here Sat. night or Sun e one ~h18 week end. He 
Sat. night 8 p. m. at cor Ver~:or~. If Interested meet me 
counter. I have spare r~om com t efferson ~wl drug cigar 
and see him. Friendly yo G e stay all mght to be sure 
. . urs, eorge Crocker" Th· 
wrItten In pencil all but th . .. 18 was Alb ' e SIgnature bemg . .. 
. ertson discussed the invitation with h. In. prIntIng. 
deCIded that he should kee th . IS WIfe and they 
p e appomtment because he 
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needed a job and had followed the trade of blacksmith. 
Albertson asked his wife to accompany him but she declined 
because she was not feeling well and did not want to keep 
up Charlene (a young girl who was living with them), and 
because he told her that more than likely he would be back 
that evening. He drove to Jefferson and Vermont Streets, 
and at about twenty minutes to 8 :00 0 'clock he parked hiR 
car on the south side of Jefferson Street. He waited there 
but no one showed up, so he entered the drug store and 
inquired of a rather large lady if a Mr. Crocker had been 
at the store inquiring for him. Receiving a negative reply 
he stated that he had ail. appointment there with Mr. Crocker. 
and the lady suggested that he contact the girl who was com-
ing on duty at 8 :00 o'clock and leave word With her for 
this Mr. Crocker. He then returned to his car and wrote 
the license number of the car and his name on a piece of 
cardboard. He went back to the- drug store, inquired of a 
different young lady, and left the card. He again returned 
to the automobile and in a few minutes a man approached 
and asked if he was Mr. Albertson, introducing himself as 
Mr. 0 'Connor. He told Albertson that Crocker was unable 
to keep the appointment because he had to work at Sears-
Roebuck until around 9 :00 o'clock, and had sent O'Connor 
in his place. The two men sat in the car and conversed on 
various subjects, 0 'Connor stating that he was temporarily 
out of work, was a gardener by trade and was anxious to 
get placed ill that sort of employment. Albertson said he 
had a friend of the family who was a gardener for the board 
of education, referring to Kmetz, and that. if 0 'Connor 
would contact Kmetz he might secure w.ork. He gave O'Con-
nor a card with the name and address of Kmetz on it. This 
part of the conversation concerning the giving of the name 
of Kmetz was not related to the police at first, but was told 
by Albertson at a later date. . 
After some further conversation, and at O'Connor's sug-
gestion, Albertson drove to the vicinity of the Sears-Roebuck 
store where 0 'Connor said they would meet Crocker as he 
came off duty. When they reached that location O'Connor 
told Albertson to pull up, that he saw Crocker waiting. 
Albertson stopped the car, O'Connor got out, and there was 
another man standing at the curb. This man, whom Albert-
son had never seen before, said "Hello, AI" and put out his 
hand. Albertson shook hands with him. and the man then 
j i 
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got into the fr?nt seat while 0 'Connor got into the back :c~. A~he man In the front seat then pulled out a bottle arid 
o . . ertson to have a drink. Albertson said he was not a 
drInkIng m.an, to which the other replied, "This is one time 
you are gOIng to take a d~ink." 0 'Connor, from the back 
seat, then pushed somethIng into Albertson's back which 
Albertson thought was a gun, the man in the front seat held 
the bottle to Albertson's mouth, held his shoulders and 
Albertson drank Afte h t t' h ' f th ff' r a s or Ime e became unconscious ~om e e ects of the drink. When he came to he was in ~18 underwear, lying in a vacant lot. He wandered about 
In the general vicinity until he observed a party in progress 
and a couple of Mex~can boys on the sidewalk. He called ~ne of them over to hIm and asked the lad to call the police ~~a~ment. It was pursuant to this call that the police 
PIC e Alb.ertson ~p. At the police station he stuck to his 
story notWIthstandIng ~he officers' disbelief. His abandoned 
hcar ~abd falready b~en pIcked up by the police in the manner ereIn e ore descrIbed. 
th So .far as appears, neither Kmetz nor Albertson knew on 
e mght of August 30th, Or on Sunday, August 31st, that ~e other had been assaulted. On Monday following Labor 
hay, Mr. and Mrs. Kmetz drove in about noontime to visit 
t e Alber~sor;s. T~ey noticed that the Albertson car was 
gone. ThIS ImmedIately led to a conversation about the 
occ~rrences of August 30th and the two men exchanged 
storIes. As Kmetz related his assault, Albertson did not ap-
~ear to ~rs. ~metz to be nervous, but, according to her tes-t~mony, he Just appeared to be somebody who had been 
SIck and who had gotten up but was not able to be up " Mr ~metz, after hearing that Albertson had given his ~ssaiIa:t 
t e Kmetz name and address, advanced the theory that un-d~ubtedly the man. took Albertson's car and proceeded to 
assault Kmetz. ThIS theory harmonized with the time ele-
ment so far as Albertson's testimony that he was assault d 
about 9 :00 0 'clock and the Kmetz testimony that he w~s 
assaulted about 10 :20 are concerned, but would not explain 
how. the officer could have been chasing the Albertson auto-
mobIle at the same time, unless Mrs. Kmetz misread the time 
on her watch, or the watch was a little fast. If Albertson 
and Kmetz, through their church work had mad 
. ,e a common 
enemy, who ~rIed to murder Kmetz and throw suspicion on 
Albertson, thl8 t~eor! would fully explain the double assaults 
and the later pOlsoiling plan. 
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After the Albertsonsand Kmetzes had exchanged stories 
of the assaults, they all drove to revisit the scene and to call 
at the sheriff's substation. From the latter place they pru-
ceeded to the Kmetz home, where both men were interviewed 
officially in the presence of each other. Kmetz fiXed the time 
of his assault at 10 :15 p. m., instead of 10 :20, and Albert-
son became excited and advanced the opinion that it must 
have been his car that the assailant escaped in. Kmetz seemed 
to agree. 
Albertson was told that the police officers had his car and 
the personal effects found in it, including the Crocker postal 
card, and he stated that he did not know the man who. wrote 
the card. The following day he and Mrs. Albertson again 
called at the sheriff's office and Albertson was interviewed 
alone. He again repeated his story and reiterated that it 
was the truth. The officers again refused to credit it, and 
one testified: "I told him that it appeared very much to 
me that this robbery was the result of some act of perver-
sion, and I wanted to know if that was the truth, and he 
said that it was not." At the completion of the interview 
Mrs. Albertson was brought in and Albertson said to her: 
,. This man believes I am lying; he says I am lying about 
this whole thing." The officer then so stated to Mrs. Albert-
son. Another officer then checked over what Albertson had 
said and explained why they did not believe it, and Mrs. 
Albertson replied: "Well, he is my husband, he has always 
been good to me, I know it sounds awfully funny, but I still 
must believe him." The police then refused to have any~ 
thing more to do with the case and returned to Albertson 
his property, including the Crocker postal card (Ex. 30). 
Thereafter the friendship of the Kmetzes and the Albert-
sons was uninterrupted and they continued to exchange visits 
on an average of once a week until the time of the murder. 
The murder caused the reopening of the police investiga-
tion. They advanced the theory that Albertson deliberately 
planned to kill Kmetz; that he wrote the Crocker postal to 
himself to furnish an excuse for leaving his home on the 
evening of August 30th; that he left the message at the drug 
store for the purpose of establishing an alibi for himself; 
that there were no such persons as Crocker and 0 'Connor; 
that he was not drugged or robbed, but in fact proceeded 
to the Kmetz home and there concealed himself until the 
return of the family j that he assaulted Kmetz with intent 
. : ~; 
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to kill him, and then faked. th . ' further protection But th' d e assault on humelf for his 
if Albertson, clad only i: h~:s no~ gibe with the fact that 
Kmetz, Kmetz would hav b un . erwear, had assaulted 
of his assailant's attire w~ileee~aCOg~Izant. of t~e peculiarity ~ave reported it; and if Alber~so~plmg wIth hIm and would 
It would have been impossible f ~ad not then been so clad 
and effects and pile them neatl or hIm to remove his clothing 
seems obvious because the rna: on the seat .o~ the car. This 
son. car while the police pursue;~~ w~s drIvm~ the. Albert· 
donmg the car to J'ump t' t on y had tIme, m aban· 
. ' ou m 0 the sh bb ' The polIce car was within sight 11 th r~ ery and escape. 
hand; the theory of a co a. e tIme. On the other 
the facts. mmon assaIlant is plausible under 
When, subsequent to the d 
search the Albertson tent hou mur er, t~e officers wished to 
no objection but turned . Set~ndk traIler, Albertson offered 
permitted them to take t:ver e eys to the premises and 
were later placed in evid:n sev~rall l~~ters and postals which 
(Ex. 30). In an endeavor t:e, ~nc u mg the Crocker postal 
Crocker postal to himself th s ~ that Albe.rtson wrote the 
exemplars (Ex. 31a and' Ex e 301b cers had hIm prepare two 
some respects similar and i' th)' J.h~ exemplars are in 
inaI. One exemplar (E 3~b 0 ers ~sImilar to the orig. 
original (Ex 30) th fiX. ) reads hne for line with the 
'd' ., erst and last words 0 h l' , 
I entlCaI. Albertson testified th t h' n eac me bemg 
officers told him to mak h' a t IS occurred because the 
as he could Th ffi e IS copy as near like the orirnnal 
. e 0 cers deny th' d . b~ 
tated the postal card messa IS ~n state that they die· 
able that a dictated note ge'ld But It scar~ely seems believ-
the original, even if both WO~tal <3ome out ~me for line with 
hand The oth IPs were wrItten by the same 
.' er posta card (Ex 31 ) 
tlOn bears little resemblanc t th' ~. on casual examina-
E 'd e 0 e orIginal (E 30) VI ence was given by hand 't' x.. 
of the theory that Alb ts wri mg experts in support 
30) and the two exemp~:rsO(Ewro~~ the ;r~ginal postal (Ex. 
the Mackelroy signature on t~' : an. . x. 31b), and also 
plaining the basis of this ~ a. vertIsmg letter. In ex-
"Now, I spoke a moment a cone uSlOn,. o.ne. exp~rt testified: 
larities. I perhaps could t:~e a~out dISSImIlarItIes and simi-
haps months, in ointin ours ?r days or weeks, per-
handwriting of M~ Albe gt out the dl~~rences between the 
31.B, and in the ~ther e:::pl~nrsEoxfhhI~lt 31~~ and Exhibit IS wrltmg; but I do 
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not [think] that merely pointing out differences wonld avail 
me anything in coming to a conclusion. It is really a mat· 
ter, in my judgIllent, of evaluating differences. I think the 
differences should be noted very carefully, because in any 
handwriting, and any identification problem, the differences 
should be noted, and sometimes they are really more impor· . 
tant than the similarities. But in any event, handwriting 
identification is a combination of two things, accurate obser· 
vation and correct reasoning applied to what is seen. With· 
out the reasoning process applied to those differences of 
course I don't think anything could be identified. . . . " 
Thereafter, the expert classified "the differences in Exhibit 
30" as "explainable differences to those found .in Exhibits 
31-A and 3l.B". and stated:" I think that Exhibit 30 was 
without questioI). written by the same person who wrote Ex-
hibits 3l·A and 3l·B." Counsel for Albertson suggests that if it would take the 
handwriting expert "honrs or days or weeks, perhaps 
months" to point out differences in the handwriting of 
Albertson on the several exhibits, "then it is permissible to 
inquire of what possible value such testimony could be to a 
layman on the jury. The statement seems utterly absurd 
and we are unable to follow the processes of reasoning lead-
ing up to his conclusion." 
Another handwriting expert testified: "Well, it is my 
opinion, without any reservation, that the same person wrote 
all three of these exhibits. There is an overwhelming indi-
viduality in this questioned writing, when you study.all these 
. characters and see how they are made, the size of them, the 
spacing of them, the slant of the letters, the pen strokes, all 
the factors that enter into the considerf!,tionof thishandwrit-
ing;" But this witness was also troubled by "differences" 
for he said: "I might state that it has been my observa~ 
tion, from examining this writing that there are more differ-
ences between the two specimens of admitted writing [Ex. 
3la and Ex. 3lb] than there are between the questioned writ-
ing [Ex. 30] and the specimens of admitted handwriting. 
... There are probably more differences .between the genuine 
writing on these two cards (Ex .. 3la and Ex. 3lb 1 than there 
is between the questioned writing (Ex. 30], and the writing 
on Exhibit 31.B. That doesn't apply to 3l-A." 
Is it not obvious that the differences prove, if anything, 
that when Albertson prepared similar exemplar 3lb he was, 
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~ he testified, .trying to ~bey the admonition of the police 
o h cer to make It as near lIke the original postal as he could 
~ er~as. ~hen he wrote dissimilar exemplar 3la he was print~ 
Ing In hIS own form? He testified: "Q. What d'd V 
Meter say t h h I an 
f E · 0 you w en e asked you to copy Exhibit 31 B rom xhlbit 30? A He told t -
I could Q Ad' th me. 0 cOpy that as near as 
far as' . n IS at what you dId T A. Yes, sir. Q. As 
M V yO~ were able to you made an exact copy of the card 
A r d an. eter gave you at that time Y A. That is correct" 
n agaIn: . ". Q. Now, when you were asked by Van Met~r 
to copy ExhIbIt 30, when you made this Exhibit 31-B d' d 
he tell you how to 't 0 A" , I 
copy I I • As near like the original 
: I C~~ld. Q. hDid he tell you to copy the letters and make 
em e same s ape, if possible Y A. He said to copy it as 
near as I could." " 
~his sta~e of proof directs attention at once to one of the 
maIn questIOns argued on appeal to wit· W,,,, th I . 
'd' ,. ..., e vo umInOUS 
eVI ence relatIng to'the prior occurrence, and not part of 
the res gestae b~t remote by forty-three days, admissible 
when ~he conn~ctIOn of the occurrence with the defendant 
and Wlt~ the crIme charged is shown only by a theory f th 
prosecutIOn. based upon circuInstantial evidence, and th~ evi~ 
dence relatIng to the crime charged is Is I cI'rcum-
stan tial ? a 0 pure y 
lIt .is evident that the admission of this volume of evidence 
;~ at~ng to the suspicious circumstances which Occurred on 
e mght of Aug~st 30th was prejudicially erroneous. [3] The 
general rule, umversally recognized is that I'n " I 
t' h '  crImIna prosecu IOn t e defendant can be tried for no oth ff t~an th~t which he is charged in the indictment or e~n~or::~ t~on; eVIdence of collateral independent crimes is not admi 
SIble (Wharton's Criminal Evidence, secs. 343, 344, . 48s3 
et seq.; 20 Am.Jur., sec. 309, p. 287· 22 C J S sec 6P82 1084 t 8 C I ,. . ",. P 
e seq .. : " a .Jur., sec. 167, p. 58 et seq· 13 Cal Ju' . 
sec 84 p 703 t ) . , . r., 
t" , '. e seq. The equally well recognized excep-I~ns to thIS rule are clearly defined. [4] Evidence of th 
crImes may be ad 'tt d h . 0 er th' mi e w en It tends directly to establish 
e crIme charged by proving a material fact where it is 
part of the res. ge~tae, or. where it helps to di;close motive 
Intent, premedItatIOn, gUIlty knowledge malic ' 
mon pIa h (2 ,e, or a com-
n or sc eme 0 Am. Jur., sec. 310 et seq 289 et 
seq:; 22 C.J.B., sec. 683 et seq. p. 1089 et seq. W·,.P. , 
EVIde 1 II h ' . , Igmore on 
nce, vo . ,c. XIII, p. 191 et seq.; Wharton's Criminal 
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Evidence, sec. 345 et seq., p.487 et seq.; 8 Cal.Jur., sec. 168 
et seq., p. 60 et seq.; 13 Cal.Jur., sec. 84 et seq., p. 703et seq.) 
[5] The trial court, however, should be guided by the rule 
that such proof is to be received with "extreme caution," 
and if its connection with the crime charged is not clearly 
perceived, the doubt is to be resolved in favor of the accuf;ed, 
instead of suffering the minds of the jurors to be prejudiced 
by an independent fact, c.arrying with it no proper evidence 
of the particular guilt. (People v. Lane (1893), 100 Oat 
379, 387-390 [34 P. 856] ; 13 Cal.Jur., sec. 84, p. 707; 8 Cal. 
Jur., sec. 168, p. 61.) '1'he textwriter explains the limited 
application of the exceptions to the general rule in these 
words (Wharton's Criminal Evidence, sec. 360, p. 567): 
"Certain condition:'! must always exist as a predicate to the 
admission of evidence of other crimes. Such evidence, being 
a departure from the general rule of exclusion, is only ad-
mitted to render more certain the ascertainment of the exact 
truth as to the charge under trial. In any loose relaxation 
of the rule, the danger to the accused is that evidence may 
be adduced of offenses that he has not yet been called upon 
to defend, of which, if fairly tried, he might bc able to acquit 
himself. 
"In the first place, the collateral offense for which an 
accused has not been tried tends to prove his inclination 
towards crime, that is, to render morc probable his guilt 
of the charge under trial, which is an absolute violation of 
the rule. It does not reflect in any degree upon the intel-
ligence, integrity, or the honesty of purpose of the juror 
that matters of a prejudicial character find a permanent 
lodgment in his mind, which will, inadvertently and uncon-
sciously, enter into and affect his verdict. The juror does 
not possess that trained and disciplined mind which enables 
him either closely or judicially to discriminate between that 
which he is permitted to consider and that which he is not. 
Because of this lack of training, he is unable to draw con-
clusions entirely uninfluenced by the irrelevant prejudicial 
matters within his knowledge .... 
"A man may fully recover from the effects of judicial 
tribulation where it affects only his property or material in-
terests. But recovery from the effects of a charge that in-
volves his reputation and character, and that threatens his 
liberty or his life, is a recovery only in name. Absolute 
a3 C.24-18 
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acquittal cannot completely restore him to the place he once 
held. The stain of prosecution cannot be eradicated. These 
momentous consequences demand a rigorous enforcement of 
the rule, in criminal charges, that evidence of the collateral 
offense must never be admitted, unlesE. it can be applied to 
more certainly demonstrate the truth. Hence: (a) Ground 
must first be laid implicating the accused in the charge under 
trial, and unless sufficient evidence of this has been, in the 
opinion of the trial judge, fi~st adduced, all evidence of 
other offenses must be excluded; (b) the collateral offense 
cannot be put in evidence without proof that the accused 
was concerned in its commission; (c) there must be iden-
tity of person or crime, scienter, intent, system, Or some 
integral parts of the exceptions established between the 
charge under trial and that sought to be introduced, that 
clearly connects the accused, showing that the person who 
committed the one crime must have committed the other. In 
other words, some connection between the other crime and 
the crime charged must be shown, and it must be shown with 
reasonable certainty that the accused committed the other 
crime. " 
[6] In the present case the evidence of the events of August 
30th obviously failed to satisfy the requirements set forth 
as (b) and (c) in the above quotation. At most it showed 
that defendant's account of his whereabouts on that night 
was considered incredible by the police, and that defendant, 
or his car, might or might not have been by the Kmetz home. 
It was insufficient to create more than a mere suspicion that 
defendant might have been the assailant of Kmetz. More-. 
over, it was placed before the jury under an instruction which 
was clearly erroneous, and failed to bring it within any of 
the recognized exceptions to the general rule of inadmissi-
bility. This instruction, already quoted herein, told the jury 
that "the defendant is not on trial in this case for any crime 
connected with an assault upon John Kmetz on or about the 
30th of August, 1941. The evidence with regard to the 
transactions of August 30th, 1941, are to be considered by 
you only as the same may relate to the matter of the rela-
tionship of the defendant to John Kmetz, the matter of pre-
meditation, the matter of malice or the matter of motive. 
Such evidence may not be considered by you for any other 
purpose. " 
[7] This instruction was erroneous and misleading, and it 
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invaded the province of the jury in that it was unqualified 
by any statement that before the jurors could consider the 
testimony for the specified purposes, they must conclude, first, 
that Kmetz was in fact assaulted on the night of Au.gust 
30th and, second, that defendant was in fact the assaIlant 
of John Kmetz on that night. . 
Separately considering the elements referred to In the 
instruction it will be seen that the evidence as to the assault 
tended to ~rove nothing at all with respect "to the matter 
of the relationship of the defendant to John Kmetz," for 
no relationship between them other than a fr~endl;r o?e was 
shown and there was no evidence whatsoever IdentIfYIng de-
fendant as the assailant. As to "motiv'El" there was no proof 
whatsoever. That the victim may have been assaulted by 
someone some six weeks before he was poisoned adds ~oth-, 
ing to the bare fact that no motive was revealed for ~Ither 
act. Without identification of defendant a.s the, ,assaIlan~, 
the assault evidence did not tend to show eIther premedI-
tation" or "malice." Furthermore, these two elements were 
established by the receipt of the poisoned capsules, and no 
strength was given to that conclusive showing by proof of 
merely suspicious occurrences, not part of the ~es gestae, 
which proof would in any event at most b~ cumulatIve. Other 
elements, not mentioned in the instructIon but r.eferred ~ 
in the briefs are likewise not involved. The eVIdence dId 
not tend to p~ove any "common plan or scheme' 'on the part 
of defendant; it showed no "gui~ty .knowledge" and no 
"material fact" concerning the pOIsomng. The occurrence 
was remote in time, and not, part of t~e res gestae. As to 
"identity" or "intent" it was insuffiCIent to do more than 
arouse cumulative suspicions. . . 
[8] It is true that where evidence of a pnor offense 18 pro'!?-
arly admissible under the exceptions to the genera] rule" It 
is not necessary to prove all of the elements of that offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt, as would be the case were .the 
defendant standing trial for it as well as for the crIme 
charged. (People v. Lisenba (1939), 14 Cal.2d 403, 429-
432 [94 P .2d 569], and cases there reviewed.) But the proof 
must nevertheless be sufficient to arouse more than mere s,?s-
picion· it must afford "substantial evidence" that the prIor offens~ was in fact committed by the defendant. (People v. 
Lisenba, S1tpm; Scott v. State (1923), 107 Ohio St: 47,5 [141 
N.E. 19, 26J, overruling Baxter v. Statel 91 OhlO St. 167 
'" . 
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[110 N.E. 456] ; State v. Hyde, 234 Mo. 200 [136 S.W. 316, 
Ann.Cas. 1912D 191]; Wharton's Criminal Evidence, sec. 
366, p. 584; 20 Am.Jur., sec. 318, p. 299; 3 A.L.R. 784-786; 
22 C.J.S., sec. 690, p. 1112; Commonwealth v. Petrillo, 338 
Pa. 65 [12 A.2d 317, 325] ; State v. Ebel, 92 1lfont. 413 [15 
P.2d 233].) 
To thus emphasize the degree of proof required, varying 
terms have been used for guidance of the trial court. "The 
evidence which can be so used cf other crimes presupposes 
that the other crime is prima facie established by competent 
proof" (Commonwealth v. Petrillo, supra, at p. 325), "To 
render such evidence admissible, it must be shown that it 
substantially establishes the defendant's guilt as to such 
other crime ... or, in other words, it must be shown with 
reasonable certainty that the accused committed the other 
crime .... " (State v. Ebel, sttpra, at p. 237.) " ... The 
degree of proof required in this class of testimony is held 
on excellent authority to be positive or substantial, but not 
'beyond a reasonable doubt.''' (Scott v. State, supra, at p. 
26; see State v. Hyde, supra, 234 Mo. at p. 250, 136 N.W. at 
p. 331.) "Before evidence of the commission of other crimes 
by accused is admitted, the trial court should satisfy itself 
that the evidence substantially establishes the other crimes, 
clear and convincing proof, and the making out of at least 
a prima facie case, being required; evidence of a vague and 
uncertain character, offered for the purpose of showing that 
the accused has been guilty of similar offenses, should not 
be admitted under any pretense whatever, nor is mere sus-
Hpicion, or proof of a suspicious circumstance, sufficient. So, 
before guilty intent may be inferred from other similar 
crimes, they must be established by evidence which is legal 
and competent and plain, clear and conclusive .... " (22 
C.J.S., sec. 690, p. 1112.) 
Here, the fact that the circumstantial evidence of the 
prior merely suspicious occurrences was adduced in great 
quantity so that it comprises a large part of the voluminous 
record, cannot serve as a substitute for "substantiality" 
where none exists. This erroneously admitted proof shows, 
if anything, that it must by very reason of its voluminous-
ness have tended to confuse the jurors and warp their judg-
ment. [9] Circumstantial proof of a crime charged cannot be 
intermingled with circumstantial proof of suspicious prior 
occurrences in such manner that it reacts as 11 psychological 
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factor with the result that the proof of the crime charged is 
used to bolster up the theory or foster suspicion in the mind 
th~t the defendant must have committed the prior act, and 
the conclusion that he must have committed the prior act 
is then used in turn to strengthen the theory and induce 
the conclusion that he must also have committed the crime 
charged. This is but a vicious circle. Here the ev:idence of 
suspicious prior occurrences affords no subs.tantml proof 
whatsoever connecting defendant in any way wIth the charge 
on which he was tried. 
The judgment and order denying a new trial are reversed, 
and the cause is remanded for a new trial. 
Shenk, J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J., Concurring.-I agree with the conclusion 
in the majority opinion that it was prejudicial error to admit 
the evidence with regard to the assault of August 30, 1941. 
This evidence, in my opinion, was insufficient to enable a 
reasonable jury to conclude that it was more probable that 
defendant committed the assault than that he did not. 
There were other prejudicial errors that constitute addi-
tional reasons for reversing the judgment. There was, first, 
the readina' from the transcript of defendant's testimony at 
the former'" trial and the subsequent oontradiction of that tes-
timony by witnesses called by the prosecution. If the tes~i-
. mony of a witness at the first trial of ~ case does not contam 
assertions concerning material facts, it is irrelevant at a sec-
ond trial and therefore inadmissible. Even if the witness 
testified to material facts, his declarations at the first trial 
are hearsay at the second trial and not admissible under sec-
tion 1870(8) of the Code of Civil Procedure unless "the wit-
ness is deceased, or out of the jurisdiction, or unable to 
testify." None of these reasons exists in the present case. 
The admission of this testimony, therefore, was not proper 
unless permitted under other exceptions to the hearsay rule. 
False statements by a defendant to those investigating the 
commission of the crime are admissible if they indicate con-
sciousness of guilt. Although hearsay, they are receivable 
as admissions and are proveable because they are regarded 
as assertions by the accused tending to show guilt. Thus, 
such statements have been held adlllissible because they in-
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volved an attempt by the accused to establish a false alibi 
(People v. Miller, 19 Cal.App.2d 708 [66 P.2d 448]), the 
giving of false explanations for the possession of goods al-
legedly stolen (People v. Oox, 29 Cal.App. 419 [155 P. 1010] ; 
People v. Martin, 16 Cal.App.2d 515 [60 P.2d 1014]), the 
denial by a defendant that he knew his codefendant, imme-
diately subsequent to the wrecking by that codefendant of a 
stolen car in which the defendant was a passenger (People 
v. Z'abriski, 135 Cal.App. 169 [26 P.2d 511]), and the denial 
by defendant that he had delivered carpets to a thief when 
the question was whether the carpets had been delivered 
innocently or as part of a scheme to defraud (People v. Oole, 
141 Cal. 88 [74 P. ,547]). Similarly, in People v. Arnold, 
43 Mich. 303 [5 N.W. 385, 38 Am.Rep. 182], the falsehood 
,consisted of a fictitious reason for being present at the scene 
of the crime. 
It has never been suggested, however, that every falsehood 
voiced by the defendant between the time of the crime and 
the trial can be admitted on this basis, for it is well known 
that all persons are liable to make errors in the description of 
past events. Consciousness of guilt is proved, not by evi-
dence of such slips, but by fabrications which, like devious 
alibis, are apparently motivated by fear of detection, or which, 
,like devious explanations of the possession of stolen goods, 
suggest that there is no honest explanation for incriminating 
circumstances ap,d thus are admissions of guilt. Before evi-
, dence of false statements by a defendant may be received, 
the cou,rt must determine whether the falsehood is one that 
may be rel;\sonably construed as implying such an admission; 
otherwise evidence might be received that is in no way rele-
vant to the issues and therefore seriously prejudicial to the 
defendant because it indicates to the jury that he is a dis-
honest person. 
The errors proved by the prosecution in the present case 
have none of the characteristics of such admissions. From 
the transcript of defendant's testimony at the former trial, 
it appeared that defendant answered "No" when asked 
whether he had said to one of the officers in the course of the 
investigation, "I did not pass any opinion on the man 
(Kmetz) outside of that he was twenty years older and that 
he had two children, and that if she wanted to consider these 
things, if she actually loved the man there was no objection." 
Defendant answered "Yes" when asked whether he had told 
Jan. 1944] PEOPLE v. ALBERTSON 
[23 C,2d 550J 
583 
any of the officers investigating the case of a conversation he 
had described with 0 'Connor, the person who he alleged had 
robbed him of his car and clothes at the time of the assault 
on Kmetz, to the effect that 0 'Connor had worked as a rail-
wayman. He expressed considerable doubt, however, as to 
which officer he had spoken of the conversation but indicated 
that it might have been Officer Bowers. After the transcript 
was read, Officer Bowers took the stand and testified that 
defendant had not described this conversation to him but 
had made the statement set forth concerning Kmetz. Parts 
of the transcript were also read containing an admission by 
defendant that he had filled out an application for a job 
stating falsely the extent of his education as well as a state-
ment by defendant that he knew no one named Crocker, which 
was followed by testimony, induced by the exhibit of one of 
defendant's notebooks, that he knew a woman named Hedwig 
Crocker, aged ninety. 
These errors were not indicative of consciousness of guilt. 
It is irrevelant that defendant made out a false employment 
application and could not remember a Mrs. Crocker. A 
guilty person would have no reason to withhold the state-
ment concerning the age of Kmetz, for such a statement is 
one that any friend of the girl might make. The statement 
that "if she actually loved the man there was no objection" 
does not indicate any hostility to the deceased. Defendant's 
assertion that he had told Officer Bowers of his conversation 
with 0 'Connor cannot reasonably be regarded as an admis-
sion of guilt, particularly in view of his doubt ,as to whether 
he had or had not mentioned the matter to Officer Bowers. 
There was, therefore, no legitimate ground for the admis-
sion of this evidence. Its admission permitted the prosecu-
tion to do indirectly what it could not do directly, namely, 
attack the character of the accused for veracity, a trait that, 
unless he takes the stand, is not involved in a trial for mur-
der and is therefore not a proper subject of inquiry. (People 
v. Burke, 18 Cal.App. 72 [122 P. 435] ; People v. McMillan, 
59 Cal.App. 785 [212 P. 38] ; People v. Derrick, 85 Cal.App. 
406 [259 P. 481] ; People v. Peterson, 120 Cal.App 197 [7 
P.2d 366] ; see 1 Wigmore on Evidence, 3d ed., p. 438.) 
In addition, evidence was introduced that several of the 
police officers told defendant they did not believe his story 
when he described how 0 'Connor took his car and clothes. 
;" 
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These declarations were hearsay (People v. Yeager, 1D4 Cal. 
452, 486 [229 P. 40]) and expressions of opinion on the 
part of the officers. Had defendant remained silent when 
the officers expressed these opinions, they might have been 
admitted on the theory that defendant conceded their truth 
by his silence. He protested, however, that his story was 
true, and there was therefore no ground for admitting the 
officers' declarations. (People v. Teshara., 134 Cal. 542 [66 
P. 798] ; People v. Lapara, 181 Cal. 66 [183 P. 545] ; People 
v. Yeager, supra; People v. Ayhens, 16 Cal.App. 618 [117 P. 
789] ; People v. Wilson,61 Cal.App. 611 [215 P. 565].) 
The trial court erred again when, of its own volit.ion, it 
instructed the jury as follows: "You are further instructed 
that a defendant in a criminal case cannot be compelled 
. to be a witness against himself, and that the defendant in 
this case has the privilege of declining to take the witness 
stand and testify. The Const.itution of the State of California 
provides as follows: 'In any criminal case, whether the de-
fendant testifies or not, hi~ failure to explain or to deny by 
his testimony any evidence or facts in the case against him 
may be COtnlllented upon by the court and by counsel, and 
may be considered by the court or the jury.' Constitution 
of California, Article I, section 130" 
This instructionwM prejudicially erroneous, for it im-
posed no limitations on the jury as to what consideration 
it could give defendant's failure to testify and left the jury 
free to infer guilt from that fact alone. 'rhe jury is not 
free under, the constitutional provision to give defendant's 
failure to testify any cOllsideration it sees fit, any more than 
court or counsel are free to make any comment thereon. they 
see fit. (See People v. Oftey, 5 Ca1.2d 714, 724 [56 P.2d 
193].) Before the constitutional amendment it was error 
to comment on the defendant's failure to take the stand or 
to advise the jury that it. could draw inferences unfavorable 
to him on that a0count. (People v. Tyler, 36 Cal. 522.) The 
constitutional aruendment changes the rule of the Tyler case 
and permits such comment but does not do more. It does 
not relieve the prosecution of the burden of establishing 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt by cOIllpetent evidence. 
(People v. Sawaya, 46 Cal.App.2d 466, 471 [115 P.2d 1001].) 
If the prosecution fails to meet this burden, the jury cannot 
infer guilt from the failure of the defendant to take the 
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stand. If, however, the prosecution has introduced compe-
tent evidence on every element of the crime, the jury, in 
weighing the evidence and drawing inferences therfrom, may 
consider the defendant's failure to explain evidence against 
him that he could reasonably be expected to explain. Under 
such circumstances, the jury may weigh the evidence most 
heavily against the accused and draw reasonable inferences 
that may be unfavorable to him. 
Even where the prosecution has introduced evidence on 
every essential element of the crime, however, it is not fair 
to the accused to leave the jury free, under a general instruc-
tion like that in question, to give the defendant's failure to 
testify whatever consideration it sees fit. There is then no 
protection to the accused against the jury's weighing the 
evidence most heavily against him and drawing unfavorable 
inferences from his failure to explain matters of which he 
could not reasonably be expected to have cognizance. The 
failure of the accused to testify derives significance from the 
presence of evidence that he might "explain or deny by his 
testimony, " for it may be inferred that if he had an expla-
nation he would have given it, or that if the evidence were 
false he would have denied it. (See Code Civ. Proc., sec. 
1963, subds. 5 and 6.) No such inferences, however, can 
reasonably be drawn from the silence of the accused con-
cerning matters outside his knowledge. The New Jersey Su-
preme Court, which has always allowed comment on the 
failure of the accused to testify, has recognized that "His 
failure to offer himself as a witness when his testimony could 
not meet or disprove any particular fact or circumstance ... 
probably ought not to affect him, and if so, his silence 
should not be commented on or considered." (Parker v. 
State, 61 N.J.L. 308 [39 A. 651, 653]. See, also, State v. 
Wines, 65 N.J.L. 31 [46 A. 702] ; State v. Howard, 83 N.J.L. 
636 [87 A. 436]; State v. Rubenstein, (N.J.Sup.) 136 A. 
597.) 
If the defendant had taken the stand he would not have 
been obliged to explain matters for which he could not rea-
sonably be regarded as having an explanation. Thus, in 
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 [37 S.Ct. 192, 61 
L.Ed. 442], holding that when the defendant took the stand 
the trial court could properly call the attention of the jury 
to his failure to explain matters that he could explain, the 
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court was careful to note that the trial court "did not put 
upon the defendant the burden of explaining every inculpa-
t?ry fact S?own or claimed to be established by the prosecu-
tion. The mference waa to be drawn from the failure of the 
accused to meet evidence as to those matters within his own 
k.n?wledge and as to events in which he was an active par-
tICIpant and fully able to speak when he voluntarily took the 
stand in his own behalf." If a defendant who takes the 
stand is not obliged to explain matters that he cannot rea-
sonably be expected to explain, a fortiori a defendant who 
does not take the stand is not obliged to explain such matters. 
~en.~ jurs: is instructed in general terms that it may 
c?nslder the failure of the accused to take the stand, it is 
likely to regard his silence as indicating the truth of testi-
mony.other than that relating to matters within his knowl-
edge, It may . even assume that innocent people take the 
stand and that .defendant is guilty because he did not. Since 
a conviction must be supported by something more sub-
stantial than silence, it is essential that the jury be instructed 
as to the limitations upon the consideration that it may give 
a defendant's failure to testify. 
. The court also erred in instructing the jury substantially 
m t?e language of. Penal Code section 1105 that, "Upon 
a .trIal. for murder, the burden of proving circumstances of 
mItigation or that justify it devolves upon the defendant." 
'. T~e burden of proof is usually twofold. The party bear-
Il;lg It faces a burden of persuasion, sometimes called "the 
rIsk of non-persuasion." This means that the issue must be 
determined against him if the evidence does not convince 
the trier of fact that it is more probable than not that the 
facts are as he represents them. (See 9 Wigmore on Evi. 
dence, 3d ed., sec. 2486.) He also usually has the burden 
?f going forward with the evidence, for if no evidence is 
mtr~du,ced a verdict must be directed against him. (See 
9 WIgmore on Evidence, 3d ed., sec. 2487.) In several early 
case~ this cou:t held that the burden placed on defendant by 
sectIOn 1105 mcluded both these burdens and required the 
defendant to prove circumstances of mitigation by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. (People v. Arnold, 15 Cal. 476; 
People v. Hong Ah puck, 61 Cal. 387; People v. Raten, 63 
Cal. 421, 422; but see People v. West, 49 Cal. 610.) Subse-
quently, however, these decisions were overruled (People v. 
Bushton, 80 Cal. 160 [22 P. 127, 549]) and it haa since been 
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uniformly held that an instruction requiring proof of cir-
cumstances of mitigation by a preponderance of the evidence 
is erroneous. It has been said that defendant is required 
only to produce enough evidence of such circumstances to 
raise a reasonable doubt of his guilt. (People v. Bushton, 
supra; People v. Elliott, 80 Cal. 296 [22 P. 207] ; People v. 
Post, 208 Cal. 433 [281 P. 618] ; People v. Madison, 3 Cal.2d 
668, 676 [46 P.2d 159] ; People v. Marshall, 112 Cal. 422 [44 
P. 718]; see People v. Wells, 10 Ca1.2d 610, 622 [76 P.2d 
493] .) 
However illogical it is to impose on a defendant the 
burden of raising a reasonable doubt as to his guilt when 
the prosecution already has the burden of proving his guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt, these decisions unquestionably 
have the effect of relieving the defendant of the burden of 
persuasion. The duty imposed by section 1105, therefore, is 
solely that of going forward with the evidence, of introduc-
ing evidence of circumstances of mitigation. (See 9 So. Cal. 
L. Rev. 405.) The code section thus lIas the effect merely of 
freeing the prosecution of the risk of a directed verdict in 
favor of the defendant. (People v. Milner, 122 Cal. 171, 178, 
et seq. [54 P. 833]; see 9 Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd ed., 
secs. 2487, 2512.) If, however, the jury is instructed in the 
language of section 1105, it is likely to amplify the effect of 
the section by concluding that it must decide that miti-
gating circumstances do not exist unless the defendant con-
vinces it that the existence of such circumstances is more 
probable than not. An instruction in such language is there-
fore erroneous. (People v. Oars on , 43 Cal.App.2d 40 [110 
P.2d 98].) 
An instruction in the language of a statute is proper only 
if the jury would have no difficulty in understanding the 
statute without guidance from the court. (See Formosa v. 
Yellow Oab 00., 31 Cal.App.2d 77 [87 P.2d 716] ; New York 
&; P. R. S. S. 00. v. M'Gowin Lumber &; E. 00., (CCA 8th) 
284 F. 513.) It is not proper if reasonable men might differ 
as to the construction of the statute, for it would delegate 
to the jury the function of statutory interpretation that be-
longs to the court. (Kansas Oity etc. Ry. v. Becker, 63 Ark. 
477 [39 S.W. 358] ; see People v. Ghysels, 81 Cal.App. 122 
[252 P. 1067]; People v. Pagni, 69 Cal.App. 94 [230 P. 
1001]; 1 Reid's Branson, Instruction to Juries (1936) p. 
t 
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217.) The history of section 1105 in this court makes it clear 
that a jury would not understand the section without guid-
ance. Judicial interpretation has attributed to it a meaning 
not apparent from its. language, and an instruction that fails 
to convey that interpretation is misleading and therefore 
erroneous. (See 14 R.C.L. 772.) 
It has sometimes been held that if the jury is also in-
structed that the prosecution must prove its case beyond a 
reasonable doubt, an instruction in the language of section 
1105 is not prejudicial. (See People v. Hawes, 98 Cal. 648 
[33 P. 791]; People v. Richards, 1 Cal.App. 566 [82 P. 691].) 
If the instruction as to reasonable doubt is made expressly 
applicable to the. evidence of mitigating circumstances (see 
People v. Riohards, supra) this conclusion is correct. If the 
instruction is phrased in general terms, however (see People 
v~ Hopper, 42 Cal.App. 499 [183 P. 836] ; People v. Leddy, 
95 CaLApp. 659 [273 P. 110]), a reasonable jury might 
easily conclude that section 1105 creates an exception to the 
rule that if a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt ap-
pears he must be acquitted, believing that mitigating cir-
cumstances have not been proved when it has merely been 
shown that it is not certain beyond a reasonable doubt 
whether they exist. (See People v. Marshall, 112 Cal. 422 
[44 P~ 718].) Cases such as People v. Grill, 151 Cal. 592 [91 
P. 515] ; People v. Wilt, 173 Cal. 477 [160 P. 561] j People 
v. McClure, 148 Cal. 418 [83 P. 437] ; and People v. A.ttema, 
·75 Cal.App. 642 [243 P. 461], concerned with other criti-
cisms of the use of the literal language of section 1105, do 
not establish the validity of such an instruction against the 
objection now urged. The case of People v. Burdg, 95 Cal. 
App.259 [272 P. 816], making a contrary assumption, should 
be disapproved. 
It may be contended that in the present case this in-
struction was not prejudicial because there was no evi-
dence of mitigating circumstances. It has been recognized, 
however, that if there is no evidence of such circumstances 
an instruction under section 1105 is apt to confuse the jury 
and may therefore be ground for reversal. (People v. Tapia, 
131 Cal. 647 [63 P. 1001]:) The jury can hardly be aware 
that this instruction, formally declared by the court as the 
law applicable to the case, is irrelevant. In dutifully at-
tempting to apply it to the evidence, it may have found 
siillffi.cant the words ' 'the commission of the homicide by 
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defendant being proved," and taken them to indicate the 
court's belief that this much has been proved. (People 
v. Tapia, supra .. ) It is also likely that the jury failed to ob-
serve that proof of "the commission of the homicide by de-
fendant" must precede the application of the instruction, 
and concluded that the instruction placed the burden of prov-
ing some facts on the defendant and some on the prosecution, 
thus depriving defendant of his right to have the prosecu-
tion prove all material facts beyond a reasonable doubt. Such 
an error is made the more serious by use of the statutory 
language, giving the jury the impression that defendant was 
bound to prove such facts by a preponderance of the evidence. 
There was no justification for this instruction in the a bRence 
of evidence of mitigating circumstances, for the question of 
defendant's guilt depended solely on whether or not he com-
mitted the homicide, and the jury should therefore have been 
given no instructions that did not relate to the determination 
of that question. In some cases it may be reasonable to sup-
pose that the jury ignored an instruction of this kind. (See 
People v. Wilt, supra.) The verdict in the present case, how-
ever, in view of the uncertainty of the cIrcumstantial evi-
dence presented by the prosecution and its failure to prove 
any motive for the killing, suggests that the jury may well 
have been influenced by the court's error. 
EDMONDS, J., Dissenting.-Considering the great mass 
of substantial evidence pointing unerringly to appellant as 
the perpetrator of the cunningly conceived but awkwardly 
executed murder of John Kmetz, I cannot justify on any 
logical or rational basis the labored effort of the majority 
opinion to belittle the testimony which connects Albertson 
with the commission of the crime. 
The fact that evidence is circumstantial does not detract 
from its probative value. The law makes no distinction be-
tween circumstantial and direct evidence. Whether the evi-
dence is of the one kind or the other, the same degree of 
proof is required and the final test of its sufficiency is the 
same: does the whole evidence together satisfy the minds of 
the jurors beyond a reasonable doubt of the truth of the 
charge? (People v. Parohen, 37 Cal.App.2d 215, 222 [98 P.2d 
1045] i People v. Murray, 41 Cal. 66, 67.) Circumstantial 
evidence may be as conclusive in its convincing force as the 
testimony of witnesses to the overt act (People v. Perkins, 8 
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Ca1.2d 502, 511 [66 P.2d 631] ; People v. Nagy, 199 Cal. 235, 
236 [248 P. 906]) j indeed, it often leads to a conclusion 
more satisfactory than direct evidence can produce (People 
v. Morrow, 60 Cal. 142); consequently where the circum-
stances proved reasonably justify the conclusion of the jury 
expressed in its verdict, a reviewing court may not interfere 
with the determination. (People v. Latona, 2 Ca1.2d 714 [43 
P.2d 260].) 
From the evidence presented by the prosecution the jury 
and the trial judge concluded that Albertson is guilty of the 
crime charged against him. In an attempt to minimize the 
damning effe'(t of this evidence, my associates state that it 
is "entirely circumstantial"; that "no motive whatsoever 
is shown"; that there is no proof that appellant ever "pur-
chased or otherwise procured the poison," or that the poison 
was inserted in two of the capsules prior to mailing, or that 
the .contents of the capsules "were not changed or tampered 
with" after they were received at the Kmetz home. They also 
state that if appellant had poisoned the capsules "it seems 
improbable that he would have left so wide and open a trail" ; 
also, if appellant did prepare and mail the capsules "but 
unknown to him two of them were poisoned by another, this 
would logically explain the openness with which he conducted 
his early activities and a later attempt to conceal and deny 
them." These are all matters of argument more properly 
presentable to a jury and entirely outside of the province of 
an appellate court which, under elementary rules, must affirm 
a judgment based upon substantial evidence. Concerning the 
several matters referred to in the majority opinion as not 
being covered by the evidence, it was for the jury to decide 
"what circumstances were essential to satisfy their minds be-
yond all reasonable doubt of . . . [appellant's] guilt, and 
thus constitute necessary links of such chain." (People v. 
Wilt, 173 Cal. 477, 485 [160 P. 561] ; People v. Ah Jake, 91 
. Cal. 98 [27 P. 595].) 
An appellate court is not concerned with the weight of 
the evidence, but will only consider whether it includes facts 
justifying an inference of guilt by the jury. If the evidence 
reasonably supports that inference, the judgment must stand, 
although the facts presented to the jury might also reason-
ably be reconciled with the innocence of the defendant. (Peo-
ple v. Newland, 15 Ca1.2d 678 [104 P.2d 778].) The court 
must assume in favor of the verdict the existence of every 
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fact which the jury reasonably could have inferred or de-
duced from the evidence. (People v. Newland, supl'a, at p. 681; 
People v. Perkins, "Supra; People v. Parch en, supra.) 
Kmetz received the box of poison capsules less than two 
months after he married the woman who for six years had 
been an intimate acquaintance and frequent companion of 
Albertson. The association of Esther Dockham and Albert-
son commenced when they spent much time together pre-
paring questions and answers on religious topics, and 
continued after her marriage to Kmetz to almost the very 
hour when the capsules were sent to the bridegroom. For 
on the late afternoon of the same day the poison package 
was mailed, Albertson called for the bride in his automobile 
and took her away for the week end. . 
Tending to show that Albertson sent the capsules In a 
box which he made for that purpose, and also procured and 
mailed the inducing letter which was delivered with it, is 
substantial evidence from which his guilt reasonably may be 
inferred. Read as a whole it convincingly points to him as 
the person who carried out the poison plan. Briefly sum-
marized, it shows: 
1. The two-page letter which accompanied the capsules 
was typewritten on letterheads printed upon an order place~, 
twenty days prior to the death of Kmetz, by a man w,ho p~Id 
cash for them. Although the printer was unable to IdentIfy 
Albertson as the man who had ordered the letterheads, any 
doubt that he was that man would seem to be dissipated by 
other evidence which positively connects him with the litera-
ture of "The Herb Specialty Co.," an imaginary company 
with the address of a vacant building. 
2 When the printer delivered the letterheads, he referred 
the' purchaser to the Letter Shop in Santa Monica for multi-
O'raphing. On the same day a man appeared at the Letter 
Shop with letterheads of "~he Herb Specialty. Co." and 
ordered a two-page letter wrItten from copy whIch he sub-
mitted. The employee who took this order testified th~t 
Albertson very closely resembled the man for whom she dId 
the work and the letter written by her was identified as the 
one that accompanied the poisoned capsules mailed to Kmetz. 
This employee informed the customer that if many ~opies of 
the letter were desired she would recommend that It be re-
duced in length and then mimeographed. 
3. Eight days later a man came to the same Letter Shop 
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and ordered 500 one-page letters to be mimeographed on the 
letterheads of "The Herb Specialty Co." He called for them 
on the following morning. The proprietress positively identi-
fied appellant as the man who placed this order and called 
for the mimeographed letters. The employee of the Letter 
Shop, who eight days earlier had typed the two-page letter 
which accompanied the capsules to Kmetz, also testified that 
she later cut the mimeograph stencil from the copy of the 
one-page letter that had been left with the proprietress for 
mimeographing, and that she then saw the one-page letter 
being run from the stencil cut by her on to stationery of "The 
Herb Specialty Co." The one-page letter is a condensation 
of the subject matter of the longer one. . 
4. Three days prior to the death of Kmetz, a man ap-
peared at the office of a public stenographer and notary 
public in Hollywood and requested her to address 21 envel-
opes to the persons whose names appeared on a sheet of paper 
furnished by him. When called as a witness she identified an 
envelope addressed to John Kmetz, bearing a return address 
of "The Herb Specialty Co.," as one of the envelopes she 
had written for the man. The envelope contained the two-
page letter which accompanied the poison box to Kmetz. This 
witness positively identified Albertson as the man for whom 
she did the work. 
5. A client of the public stenographer, who was in her 
office when the envelopes were written, testified he was "80 
per cent" sure that Albertson was the man he saw there at 
that time. 
6. Two. handwriting experts testified that, in their opin-
ions, the signature of the "doctor" appearing on the two-
page letter accompanying the poison box to Kmetz was in 
the handwriting of the appellant. They reached this con-
clusion after comparison with and study. of exemplars of Al-
. bertsol!. 's handwriting~ 
In addition to this uncontradicted testimony definitely 
connecting Albertson with the nonexistent "Herb Specialty 
Co., " whose name appeared on the poison box, there is other 
evidence equally substantial and persuasive which poinUi to 
Albertson as the sender of the capsules received by Kmetz. 
He is a blacksmith by trade, and cyanide is used in temper-
ing steel. It also appears that cyanogas is the trade name 
for calcium cyanide. It may be purchased in any drug, feed, 
or hardware store without a prescription or the signing of a 
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poison register, and is composed of small particles of about 
the same color (dark gray) and form as the content of the 
two capsules taken by Kmetz. 
During the first week of June, 1941, Albertson came ~o 
Miss Dockham's home in Los Angeles and took her to hIS 
trailer-tent home in San Pedro. He had been out of work 
for some time and was attending a W.P.A. welding school 
in San Pedro. Miss Dockham was not feeling well and she 
asked Albertson to get her some vitamin capsules. ;~ose he 
procured were marketed under t.he name ?f Pro-;, I~e .and 
came in a bright orange box WhICh she saId was .slmllar, 
if not identical both as to appcarance, make, extenor and 
interior" with one which was received in evidence. By Au-
gust she had taken most of the tablets and left the box in the 
trailer when she returned to Los Angeles for the opening of 
school. 
One of the handwriting experts examined the. construc-
tion of the small box which went through the mall and ex-
pressed the opinion that "the paper pasted on the top and 
bottom was not as it came from the factory. It looked to me 
like a home made job of pasting . . . the interior of the box 
was not factory made or factory assembled but was. assembled 
in a somewhat amateurish manner." More speCIfically, he 
pointed out that the pasteboard trays in the. Pro-Vite box 
identified by Mrs. Kmetz are of the same thlClmess as the 
ones in tl1e box mailed under the name of "The Herb Spe-
cialty Co." and that the holes in each showed the same work-
manship. Also, the holes in the trays of each box are of the 
same size and the same distance apart. He found that the 
holes in the trays of the Pro-Vite box are not exactly spaced, 
and demonstrated to the jury that an area, and only one 
area on the tray taken from it very accurately matches an 
area' of the.one in the box received by Kmetz. 
The forensic chemist of the police department corrobo-
rated this testimony and also gave the results of his micro-
scopic examination of the two boxes. He found that the 
cardboard stock in each is the same and that the small one 
carries some indication of the bright color of the one which 
came from the drug store. Of even mor.e significance is his 
testimony that an analysis of tiny partIcles of paste take~ 
from the upper tray of the small box showed the same chen:I-
cal content as the mucilage which was found by officers III 
the Albertson trailer Oll October 22nd. And he also told the 
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jury that on the rubber squeegee of this mucilage bottle he 
found traces of the color of the drug store box. 
Certainly this evidence does not justify the implications 
of the majority opinion that the jury reasonably could not 
have .dElduced from the. voluminous testimony any or all of 
!he CIrcumstances mentIoned as not being covered by it. To 
Illustrate: The statement that there is no evidence to show 
that the capsules were not tampered with after being received 
at the Kmetz home entirely ignores facts shown in connection 
with them. The package in which they were received bore 
the name of a fictitious company, with directions on part of 
a letterhead of this mythical organization and there came 
with it a descriptive and inducing letter si~ned by an imagi-
nary" doctor." This letter was traced to the appellant and 
handwriting experts testified that the "doctor's" signature 
was. made by him. The majority opinion also ignores the 
testImony of the daughter of Kmetz, who saw the package 
opened by he~ ~ather on October 11, 1941, and described it 
as then. ~ontalUlUg two dark and ten light-colored capsules. 
At the. tIme Kmetz tool, the capsules, his widow testified, the 
box still contained two dark and ten light-colored capsules. 
~ompliance with the enclosed directions suggesting the tak-
lUg of "2 Dark Capsules at bedtime" resulted in the death 
of Kmetz. Certainly this evidence reasonably supports the 
j~ry's implied finding that the capsules were not tampered 
WIth at the Kmetz home or elsewhere after leaving the hands 
of the sender. • 
My associates have also usurped the functions of the 
jury in asserting that "no motive whatsoever is shown" for 
appellant's commission o~ the homicide. Preliminarily, it 
sho.uld be stated that whIle proof of motive is always ma-
~erlal, and th.e abse~ce of mot~ve. may be considered by the 
Jury on the SIde of mnocence, It IS not an essential factor in 
the proof of a cr~me. If from the evidence tending to con-
nect appellant WIth the capsules and the literature which 
came with them the jurors believed he sent the poison to 
Kmetz, it was not necessary, in order for them to render a 
verdict of guilty, to find a motive which led him to do so. 
(People v. Kelley, 208 Cal. 387, 390-391 [281 P. 609] ; People 
v. Tom Woo, 181 Cal. 315, 328 [184 P. 389].) 
But there is an answer of fact, as well as of law to the 
argument of the majority opinion. Motive is the thouO'ht 
that impels one to act; it is the product of human relati~n-
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ships and environment, follows no general pattern and very 
often cannot be accounted for upon any analysis of logical 
human behavior. Conditions which induce one person to act 
in a particular way have no effect whatever upon another. 
Often there is no understandable basis for certain conduct. 
The present case, however, is not one of that class in which 
there is no evidence to show motive. Certainly in the rela-
tions of Esther Dockham and the Albertsons for six years, 
and the part John Kmetz played in them for a few brief 
months there is much that might have led to criminal con-
duct. Indeed, that evidence provides substantial support for 
concluding that anyone of several motives was the procuring 
cause of the murder. 
From 1935 when Esther Dockham took a teaching posi-
tion at San Pedro to the death of Kmetz in 1941, Albertson 
and his wife lived in a trailer and a tent house which ad-
joined it. For some time Miss Dockham lived with them; 
after she left San Pedro she frequently returned there for 
over night or longer visits. On an unspecified uum~er ~f 
occasions Mr. Albertson alone came to Los Angeles m hIS 
automobile to take her to San Pedro. 
Miss Dockham met Kmetz in September, 1940, and started 
"keeping company" with him in January, 1941. For sev-
eral months she saw him frequently. In either March or 
April Miss Dockham wrote a letter to Kmetz in which she 
stated she would not go out with him any longer. But evi-
dently Kmetz disregarded her letter and was a persistent 
suitor, for afterward he came to see her several times. And 
during these and later months of 1941 Miss Dockham was 
frequently with Albertson. The first occasion shown by the 
evidence was in February or March, 1941, when the treasurer 
of the school board was at Miss Dockham's home. Albertson 
came to see her and she introduced him as her uncle. The 
witness testified that, at the time he left, Albertson's un-
occupied car was standing in front of the house. . 
Another witness was a student at the school where MISS 
Dockham was teaching in the fall of 1941. He testified that 
when she called at his home to deliver his grade card he saw 
Albertson alone in his car in front of the house. On another 
occasion, the witness said, he saw Albertson and Miss Dock-
ham together at church. Mrs. Albertson was not present and 
they drove away together. On several ot.he: occasion~, t~e 
boy told the jury, he noticed Albertson sIttmg alone lU biS 
car near the school. 
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Even after Miss Dockham's marriage to Kmetz she con-
tinued her association with Albertson. On at least one oc-
casion he came to the Kmetz house when her husband was 
not p.resent. A~d I~metz received the poisoned capsules the 
mornmg after hIS wIfe left with Albertson to spend the week 
end at San Pedro. She was ready with her bag packed when 
Albertson called for her at 5 :00 0 'clock in the afternoon. He 
was alone. They made one stop at Gardena on the way to 
San Pedro. The next day she and the Albertsons went to 
church, at Inglewood, returning to the trailer for dinner. 
On Sunday morning she accompanied Albertson to Gardena 
on a business errand. They came back to San Pedro and 
that evening the Albertsons drove her to Los Angeles.' Two 
hours after she arrived ut her house Kmetz took the two dark 
capsules. He died shortly afterward. 
. The following morning Mrs. Kmetz spent a short time at 
the East Los Angeles School, and in the late afternoon she 
went to t~e Albertsons in San P.:ldro. Lola, Kmetz' daughter, 
accompanIed her. When Mrs. Kmetz and Lola returned to Los 
Angeles the next day, the Albertsons went with them and took 
up their residence at the East Third Street home. Mrs. Albert-
son was living there. at the time of the trial. Althougoh the 
P{~opl.e y.rere not req~llred to prove It particular, or any, motive 
for In~g Kmetz, It was for the jury to determine whether 
one mIght be inferred from this and other cvidence 
Any discussion of the existence of a possible ~otive for 
the homi?ide necessarily mllst also inelude a cOlll'ideration 
of th~ eVIdence cuncerning the assault made upon Kmetz on 
~e mght of August 30, 1941, twelve days after he had mar-
r~ed Esther Dockham and approximately six weeks prior to 
hIS death. At the outset, it may be conceded that this evi-
dence would be incompetent and inadmissible in the prosecu-
tion for murder unless it tended to prove some element of or 
motive fo: the homicide and likewise tended to connect ap-
pellant With the assault. The general rule is that evidence 
of other crimes is admissible when it tends to establish motive 
intent, absence of accident or mistake, identity, guilty knowl~ 
edge, or a common scheme or plan (1 Wharton's Criminal 
~vidence 490-4~1, se~; 345), and the trial judge accordingly 
mstructed the JUry that the defendant is not on trial in 
this case for any crime connected with an assault upon John 
Kmetz ••• The evidence with regard to .•• [such an at-
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tack is] to be considered by you only as the same may relate 
to the matter of the relationship of the defendant to J olm 
Kmetz, the matter of premeditation, the matter of malice or 
the matter of motive. Snch evidence may not be considered 
by you for any other purpose." 
The appellant contends that the instruction should have 
been qualified by the further statement that before tbis testi-
monv could be considered the jurors must believe, beyond 
any "reasonable doubt, that Albertson committed the assault. 
But the law, as recently declared by this court in People v. 
Lisenba, 14 Ca1.2d 403, 429-432 [94 P.2d 569], is to the con-
trary, for it was there held "that evidence which merely 
tends to show . . . the commission of other offenses is admis-
sible . . . even though it falls short of proving the corpus 
delicti of such other offenses." In the Lisenba case it was 
decided that as the prosecution had "made a substantial 
showing tending to prove" the prior offense, the trial court 
properly admitted what were described as "simply evidenti-
ary facts introduced for the purpose of being considered [by 
the jury], together with all of the other evidence in the case 
. . . doubtful and otherwise," in its determination of the 
ultimate fact. (People v. Lisenba, supl·a.) The majority 
opinion, in concluding that the testimony challenged by the 
appellant does not amount to "substantial evidence" that he 
committed the assault, ignores the settled rules of criminal 
procedure and adopts a theory different from that urged by 
Albertson. 
It is undisputed that shortly after 10 :00 0 'clock on the 
night of August 30, 1941, Kmetz was set upon in front of 
his home and struck over the head with a pickax handle. The 
assailant then ran across a vacant lot east of the Kemtz home, 
entered a car parked on McDonnell Avenue, which then moved 
south, made a "U" turn to the north, and drove away "as 
fast as it could go" without any lights. Before the grand 
jury Mrs. Kmetz testified that just prior to the assault she 
noticed the parked car and tr,at it looked like the automobile 
her "uncle" (appellant) drove. This testimony was read 
to her upon the trial to refresh her recollection which in the 
interim had become hazy and uncertain. She then testified 
that the car parked close to the Kmetz home immediately 
preqeding the assault resembled the automobile owned by 
Albertson. 
There is other evidence tending to connect Albertson with 
'!/. 
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this attack. About 10 :15 on the same evening, a car with 
one person in it failed to make a boulevard stop in the im-
medi~te neighborhood and was pursued by a police officer. 
After a chase of two miles, the driver of the rapidly fleeing 
car abandoned it. This automobile, registered in the name of 
M:rs. Albertson, was customarily driven by the appellant. In 
it was found, among other things, certain articles of wearing 
apparel belonging to Albertson. 
Some time after 12 o'clock that night, the appellant, clad 
only in hiB underwear, was found by the police about three 
miles from the place where the abandoned automobile bad 
been found.· He then told the fantastic story narrated in 
detail in the majority opinion. It was the province of the 
jury to determine from all of the evidence concerning the 
attack upon Kmetz, including the testimony of the hand-
writing experts that Albertson had written the "Crocker" 
postcard, whether appellant was the assailant. Had Kmetz 
named Albertson as the person who struck him with a club 
on the night of August 30th, there would be no question con-
cerning the admissibility of testimony to that effect. As the 
record R~OWS that Kmetz was unable to identify his assailant, 
the testi.'lnony from which it may very reasonably be inferred 
that Albertson was the attacker and, to divert suspicion from 
himself, fabricated his, account of the meeting with "0 'Con-
nor" and "Crocker" and the other events of that night, was 
equally relevant. The fact that the attack was six weeks 
before the death of Kmetz affected the weight, but not the 
admissibility, of the evidence, and its purpose was not to 
prove Albertson guilty of the assault but to show a motive 
for the homicide. Certainly the evidence upon this issue af-
fords a substantial basiB for an inference of motive. 
As stated in 1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence 289 section 
246, it iB "always proper for the prosecution to offer evi-
dence of motive, regardless of any collateral effect it may 
have in showing, or tending to show, the commission of an-
other offense by the accused. An inquiry in this regard is 
often of great importance, particularly in cases of circum-
stantial evidence." And in People v. Argentos, 156 Cal. 720, 
726 [106 P. 65], this court declared: "In a case where the 
identity of a person who commits a crime is attempted to be 
proven by circumstantial evidence, 8uch as in the case at bar 
evidence of a motive on the part of a defendant char.ped i~ 
always a subject of proof, and the fact of motive partic~larly 
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material. In proof of motive the prosecution has a right to 
offer any testimony which reasonably and fairly has a ten-
dency to establish it, and we are satisfied that the evidence 
which was admitted by the court and of which appellant 
complains, was relevant to, and had a logical bearing upon, 
the subject. What weight that evidence might have was a 
question for the jury, but that it was admissible, notwith-
standing it showed the defendant was charged with some 
other offense than the one for which he was being tried, and 
though its tendency might have been to prejudice him in the 
minds of the jury, is not, under the authorities, open to ques-
tion. (People v. Sanders, 114 Cal. 216 [46 P. 153].)" (See, 
also, People v. Soeder, 150 Cal. 12, 15 [87 P. 1016] ; People 
v. Wilson, 117 Cal. 688, 691 [49 P. 1054]; 1 Wharton's Crim-
inal Evidence 569, sec. 360, and authorities supra.) 
Taken as a whole thd evidence points unerringly to Al-
bertson as the person who, actuated by anyone of several 
motives, conceived and carried out a thoroughly premeditated 
plan to kill the husband of Esther Dockham. The hand of 
Albertson is clearly seen in the preparation and mailing of 
the letter in the name of "The Herb Specialty Co." There 
can be no reasonable doubt whatever that the discarded box 
in which the vitamin pills he bought for Esther Dockham 
were marketed furnished the design as well as the material 
for the vehicle used to carry the poison to Kmetz. 
The record shows that the appellant had a fair trial with 
full protection of his rights. Oertainly no error is shown 
which, after an examination of the entire cause including 
the evidence, reasonably suggests that there has been a mis-
carriage of justice. (Const., art. VI, sec. 4%.) 
For these reasons, in my opinion, the judgment and also 
the order denying a new trial should each be affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., and Curtis, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied Febru-
ary 17,1944. Gibson, C. J., Curtis, J., and Edmonds, J., voted 
for a rehearing. 
